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FOREWORD 
he European Union is challenged in the global arena by emerging 
economies as well as by the US when it comes to capturing and 
capitalising on knowledge and technology in the context of 
innovation. At the same time, the innovation chain is becoming 
increasingly complex, open and internationalised; it includes and involves 
stakeholders representing the many different sectors and parts in society, 
and often businesses coming from different regions. Faced with these 
challenges, in past years many European countries have suffered from an 
increasing lag vis-à-vis other regions of the world in terms of 
competitiveness, innovation and growth.  
To be sure, Europe already features world-leading industries and a 
few high-ranked universities. In the past few years, the budget for R&D has 
been increased and several initiatives have been launched to strengthen 
Europe’s competitiveness. So far, however, these efforts have not made the 
EU more competitive. On the contrary, a decline can be seen and the EU is 
recognised as becoming less internationalised. On top of this, the overlap 
between funding instruments and too many decision-makers has led the 
governance of EU innovation policy to become increasingly chaotic, which 
only adds complexity to a system that needs to be smoothly and effectively 
managed.  
This report presents a number of recommendations for actions that 
are needed to ensure that the EU becomes a more attractive place for 
investment and education and research opportunities. It is the result of five 
meetings held between September 2009 and May 2010 and the participation 
of numerous industry stakeholders, practitioners, academics and 
representatives of institutions such as the European Commission, the 
European Investment Bank and the European Patent Office (see list at the 
T 
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end of this report). All in all, we have found very fertile ground for a 
constructive discussion on how to ‘innovate’ in EU innovation policy. The 
overall impression is that Europe has all the necessary ‘pieces’, but the 
puzzle has to be completed by involving the stakeholders and taking 
account of market needs when choosing the direction of policy. This 
includes, but is not limited to, the funding of innovation, the Community 
patent, standards policy and technology transfer. On all these issues, this 
report provides recommendations.  
I would like to thank the invited guests and for their openness to 
discuss concerns and challenges; the members of the Task Force for their 
willingness to share knowledge and experience for the duration of the Task 
Force; the two Rapporteurs, Andrea Renda and Massimiliano Granieri, 
who have provided us with excellent support during the Task Force and in 
finalising this report; and finally, CEPS staff for creating the conditions for 
a smooth and constructive sharing of experiences and expertise within the 
context of this very valuable initiative.   
 
Maria Anvret, Chairwoman 
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INTRODUCTION AND MAIN 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
he past decade saw a gradual European ‘lag’ vis-à-vis the US, Asian 
tigers and several emerging economies in terms of research, 
development and innovation (R&D&I). The 2009 European 
Innovation Scoreboard has shown positive signs in some regions, but 
overall innovative investments by businesses still appear relatively weak. 
Importantly, highly dynamic sectors such as ICT (information 
communication technology) account for almost one half of EU productivity 
growth, but at the same time are also the main reason for the US-EU gap. 
Re-launching Europe’s ICT sector becomes even more crucial with the 
upcoming European Digital Agenda, which promises to contribute an 
estimated €500 billon, or 4% of GDP to the EU economy.  
Various reasons account for Europe’s gap, certainly including the 
current fragmentation of the Internal Market and the absence of well-
developed venture capital; the overly complex governance of EU funding 
mechanisms, coupled with the extreme fragmentation of funding tools; the 
red tape associated with access to public funds; the limited mobility of 
skilled workers throughout the EU27; the absence of legal certainty as 
regards patent law, technology transfer and standardisation processes; the 
distance between market needs and public innovation policies; and many 
others.  
Today, nothing is more important for the re-launch of the EU project 
than unleashing the potential for EU competitiveness through innovation. 
EU institutions endorsed this view in the recently adopted EU2020 
strategy, which announces seven flagship initiatives, of which at least five 
are intimately linked with innovation (Innovation Union, Digital Agenda, 
T 
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Resource Efficient Europe, A New Industrial Policy for the new 
globalisation era and an Agenda for new skills and jobs).  
In this report, we argue that Europe must take a proactive stance 
towards innovation policy and must do it in a way that accounts for the 
systemic and changing nature of innovation.  
The EU approach to innovation policy must be integrated and 
comprehensive, and should include, inter alia, education policy: the 
availability of skills should not be seen as limited to improving the 
attractiveness of Europe to highly qualified European students and 
researchers; on the contrary, Europe must compete internationally to attract 
the best skills available worldwide.  
The EU approach should also be flexible, since the nature of 
innovation has changed enormously in the past decade and has also 
become sector-specific. Today, in some sectors (e.g. ICT) collaboration 
between market players for the development of complex system goods has 
become standard practice, and calls for the definition of clear rules related 
to the standardisation process. At the same time, in other sectors (e.g. 
chemicals) the concept of ‘open innovation’ is permeating new business 
models, blurring the boundaries between individual firms’ R&D efforts and 
leading to a blossoming new era of collaboration.  
Below, we illustrate our main recommendations, and then report 
some more specific findings for the EU patent system, technology transfer 
of climate-related technologies and standardisation policy. 
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I. General comments and recommendations 
1. Innovation desperately needs a functioning EU internal market  
A functioning Internal Market is the single most important reform for EU 
innovation. Currently, financial markets are fragmented and the level of regulation 
(e.g. taxation) varies across countries. While a degree of diversity is required, a total 
lack of harmonisation prevents cross-border venture capital investment and the 
creation of funds in areas where financing for innovation is needed. Furthermore, 
the obstacles to individuals’ mobility (in terms of taxation, portability of pension 
benefits, etc.) prevent professionals and business ‘angels’ from reaching new 
markets and establishing their business where opportunities are still unexploited. 
Finally, issues such as the Community Patent, clear rules on technology transfer and 
the standardisation process are essential for a functioning Internal Market. 
 
2. The innovation challenge requires an integrated and comprehensive 
approach  
The problem to be solved (demand from the market and society) should be the 
starting point for innovation policy; the scientific questions cannot be the only driver 
for innovation. This implies that the whole innovation cycle should be taken into 
account including all the different actors in the innovation chain: industry, 
academia, public and private financing organisations, NGOs, society and citizens, 
politicians, policy-makers, etc. The discussion should go towards accepting 
innovation as a transversal concept cutting across all sectors of economic, social and 
political activity, to cover the four different kinds of innovation. Demand-side 
measures, such as the lead market initiative and pre-commercial public 
procurement, are powerful tools that should be developed to create the market 
incentives for innovation. 
 
3. There is a growing gap between public policy and the needs of private 
players 
Innovation essentially takes place in markets, and market players know best where 
consumer needs and technology developments are leading. This would justify a 
change in perspective from a simplistic, supply-side approach (i.e. pumping 
innovation into the market) to a more demand-driven approach as far as new 
applications and societal challenges are concerned, including undertaking measures 
for the simplification of regulations surrounding innovation procurement. At the 
same time, it is very important that regulation is ‘smart’ – i.e. efficient, proportionate, 
future-proof and ‘technology-neutral’, and is conceived in a way that stimulates 
further innovation, rather than exerting a chilling effect on new market 
developments. 
5 
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4. The current institutional governance of innovation policy at EU level 
is not satisfactory 
Institutional competences are too fragmented across DGs, which leads to a lack of 
policy coherence; there are too many levels of intervention and too many 
instruments for funding, creating a complex environment for potential applicants. 
The current system lacks synchronisation and is unfit to reach small firms 
effectively; innovation is not considered at all stages of the policy-making process; 
there are no indicators that track the success of innovation-oriented policies. In 
summary, there is not enough leadership, insufficient ownership and limited 
accountability. In this respect, the role of the Secretariat General in coordinating and 
directing policy is very important. The President of the European Commission 
should take the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the development of a pervasive, 
coherent, coordinated, efficient and effective innovation policy for Europe.  
 
5. Subsidiarity should guide EU innovation policy  
Governance is about much more than what happens within the Commission, even 
than what happens at EU level. Indeed, the money the EU spends on innovation is 
only a fraction of what countries spend. This fact calls for two main 
recommendations: 
• Apply the subsidiarity principle. The EU should only stimulate innovation where 
there is an evident EU added value, to be clearly demonstrated through an 
impact assessment. For instance, this could be the case where there is a strong 
need to link innovation policy with other EU policy priorities (climate, energy, 
health, etc).  
• Coordinate better the different levels of governance. There should be clearer and 
more effective coordination between member states and EU policies and 
decision-making when it comes to R&D processes. As observed in other areas 
and debates (e.g. telecoms, competition policy, financial services, etc.), it would 
be possible to establish a centralised/coordinated policy at EU level, which is 
then implemented locally by national authorities, provided the commitment is 
credible, and the reverse relationship or balance is also possible or appropriate 
depending on the area concerned, the relevant spillover effects and the 
incentives. This would require, inter alia, the definition of indicators aimed at 
tracking progress towards common targets – a need that becomes even stronger 
under the EU2020 strategy and the upcoming ‘Innovation Union’ initiative (see 
Recommendation 7 below). 
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6. Extend co-regulatory schemes in the innovation domain 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) should be extended and promoted as the 
governing principle in all cases in which strong societal needs are at stake. In PPPs, 
market players are able to avoid the current fragmentation of competences at EU 
level by involving all relevant DGs of the European Commission and all competent 
players from other EU institutions in a global dialogue that focuses on the industry, 
EU citizens and global technology challenges. Also in designing and shaping the 
new Framework Programme (FP8), market players should be involved to make sure 
that the demand perspective is adequately taken into account in deciding where 
public money should be spent in order to add value.  
 
7. Taking innovation seriously by improving leadership, ownership and 
accountability 
Putting innovation at the core of the EU policy-making process cannot be only a 
declaration of intent. There are measures that can improve leadership, ownership, 
accountability, coordination and governance. These include: 
a) Opening the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) to a representative of DG Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI). This way, the IAB would be able to send back 
proposals that have not sufficiently considered the impact of submitted new 
Commission policies on innovation and research. A representative from DG STI 
or any other IAB member in charge of representing EU innovation could also 
suggest methodologies developed by EU-funded programmes, which could be 
used in impact assessments to evaluate ex ante the impact of the proposed new 
measures on innovation.   
b) Increasing and improving the participation of officers in charge of innovation policy in 
Impact Assessment Steering Groups. This should guarantee that impacts on 
innovation are considered also at an early stage of the policy-making process.  
c) Developing indicators that track progress in the field of innovation policy and allow for an 
evaluation of the performance of policy measures in place. It is paramount that the 
performance in innovation be measured according to standard indicators, and 
not be subject to arbitrary interpretations and manipulations across Europe. The 
experience with the European Innovation Scoreboard – based on 29 indicators – 
is a useful starting point in this direction, and should be complemented by other 
tools currently used at the international level (e.g. the OECD Oslo manual, the 
tools developed by FP7 projects such as INNODRIVE). The Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) of the Commission should ideally be in charge of this task. 
d) Adopting follow-on monitoring and evaluation strategies. The implementation of 
innovation policies should be monitored ex post and evaluated according to the 
intended purposes to be achieved, in particular as regards the impact on the 
generation and successful marketing of innovations. 
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e) Empowering an agency to manage the funding instruments available for innovation and 
research, to exploit potential synergies between them and streamline 
communication with stakeholders, thus avoiding the ‘spontaneous disorder’, in 
which too many funding tools appear sub-additive rather than self-reinforcing.  
f) Coordinating innovation and research policy with other EU policy objectives already at 
the budget allocation stage, e.g. by allocating funds to projects and technology 
platforms that promise to solve today’s and tomorrow’s policy challenges.  
g) Establishing a general principle at any review stage, whereby policy-makers i) should 
mandatorily assess whether policy and governance are aligned; and whereby ii) 
if they propose a change in policy and/or the introduction of a new instrument, 
they should immediately consider candidate policies or instruments to drop, in 
order to avoid complexity. 
 
8. Financial instruments should be used more efficiently 
It is crucial that Europe invests in R&D, discriminating resources for basic research 
and for applied research and innovation. While the intensity of R&D is a key factor 
for success, quality becomes important to ensure the best, high-impact projects 
receive adequate funding and return innovation and growth on this investment.  
The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) is to be a key 
driver of sustainable European growth and competitiveness through the stimulation 
of world-leading innovations with a positive impact on economy and society. The 
EIT is the first European initiative to integrate fully the three sides of the ‘knowledge 
triangle’ (higher education, research and business-innovation) and its mission is to 
grow and capitalise on the innovation capacity and capability of actors from the EU 
and beyond. In order to unleash the full potential of European innovation there is an 
increasing need for: i) ensuring continuity between the results of projects funded by 
the European Research Council and activities undertaken the EIT; and ii) a better 
alignment of both European and national-level initiatives, in that all contribute to the 
Europe 2020 vision and goals.   
In addition to cross-border venture capital and technology transfer support 
via the European Investment Fund (EIF), the European Investment Bank (EIB) could 
consider widening the scope of applications, in particular by broadening and 
deepening risk-sharing operations, i.e. to include innovative services and demand-
side measures, such as the lead market initiative or pre-commercial procurement. 
An important issue is the EIB’s ability to reach dynamic and innovative small firms 
and help them grow through early-stage financing. Currently the EIB finds it very 
challenging to reach SMEs due to the large size of the total loan volume it manages 
compared to the relatively small number of officers in charge of their management. 
This problem should be addressed, possibly with the help of member states, by 
further developing instruments that allow for aggregation of local initiatives, such as 
clustering, to really unlock the potential of innovative SMEs.  
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II. Specific recommendations 
A PATENT SYSTEM FOR EU 2020 
9. A role for national patent offices (NPOs)  
A pan-European patent system must secure a role for NPOs. Currently NPOs sit in 
the Administrative Council of the EPO, which may create conflicts as the EPO 
becomes the EU granting authority and replaces national procedures. As for other 
procedures (trademarks, design), NPOs can remain as receiving offices for 
applications. NPOs could also play a more prominent role in raising the awareness 
of SMEs of existing innovation policies and public support to R&D&I. 
 
10. A simple language regime  
While there is a general problem of accessibility of technical information, in many 
fields scientific papers and a good share of national Patent Literature (PL) are 
written in English. If PL is a major source of technical information, then it could be 
expressed in a single language or at least a reduced language regime for Europe. 
Having to use only one language would reduce application costs and uncertainties 
related to multiple translations, positively affecting EU competitiveness.  
 
11. An acceptable and coherent  cost level of patent protection 
A pan-European system should keep the right incentives, be affordable and 
appealing in terms of protection granted. The necessity of fees must be balanced 
against the interest of applicants, particularly when the latter have limited resources 
(e.g. SMEs). EU policy-makers might introduce incentives for patent protection, for 
example by lowering fees for certain kinds of applicants, or making fees dependent 
on quality as evidenced by search reports. However, this should not lead to 
distortions. Alternatively, national or EU institutions may decide to subsidise patent 
protection for these categories of applicants, while complying with state aid rules. 
 
12. A unified patent litigation system with an acceptable level of 
centralisation 
Patent litigation is fragmented and national jurisdictions lack coordination. Any 
future litigation system must ensure that judicial application of patent laws does not 
lead to potentially conflicting interpretations even within a unified jurisdiction. 
Other issues to be solved include: i) the level of jurisdiction (and competence 
for each degree), ii) a uniform civil procedure, iii) an appropriate training for 
judges and iv) possible support for certain categories of litigants, such as SMEs. 
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13. A high-quality patent system 
Even if European patents are considered to be of a higher quality than those of other 
countries, quality remains an issue. The EPO has already started work in this 
respect. In addition, coordination between patent authorities will be increasingly 
needed, also to avoid overly restrictive approaches (for national pride, one office 
systematically rejects what others have granted) or a ‘race to the bottom’ (other 
offices grant systematically when one of them has granted). 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND CLIMATE-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES 
(CRTS)  
14. Protecting and promoting CRTs 
A lot of added value can be created along the entire value chain of CRTs. Small 
scale projects and low-cost technologies can be a field of interest for SMEs and 
local development. In addition, when investing public money for R&D, 
increased attention should be given to the generation of intellectual property 
and its transfer to the market via licensing or spin-off creation. 
 
15. Support plans for the creation of capacity in less developed countries  
The removal or weakening of intellectual property rights (IPRs), including 
compulsory licensing, is unlikely to lead to increased access to green 
technologies by less developed countries (LDCs). On the contrary, it may 
discourage investment by major players. Access to CRTs does not depend on 
the removal of IPRs and patents. Many technologies are not patented and in 
others, patents only cover a portion of the technology. The real problem is the 
ability of LDCs to understand and reproduce knowledge created elsewhere. 
Cooperation with multinationals and foreign firms is a way to create 
absorptive capacity. 
 
16. Encourage the elimination of tariff barriers for CRTs  
One serious obstacle to investment by advanced companies in LDCs and in 
general is represented by the tariff barriers that hit some technologies. 
Diffusion of such CRTs will be favoured by the elimination of possible 
discrimination in prices. 
 
17. Support actions to professionalise technology and IP management in 
universities and public research organisations  
The ‘Third Mission’ launched by the Lisbon Agenda for universities requires 
specialised human resources that universities should be able to form and 
retain, with prospects of a professional career. 
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EU institutions should devote efforts to improving the 
‘professionalisation’ of the management of public-funded universities and 
research institutions. In these institutions, board members, not directly 
benefiting themselves from decisions made, must be in the majority, and 
should ensure that overall objectives and performance indicators are used to 
monitor the performance of those institutions in the field of R&D&I. 
A NEW STANDARDISATION POLICY FOR EUROPE 
18. A clearer scope for EU standardisation policy  
Standards can contribute positively to growth and competition, especially 
when they are picked up by the market and not imposed top-down. This calls 
for a pro-active standards policy only at EU level in order to promote a sound 
standardisation process, rather than choosing the outcome.  
In promoting a sound standardisation process, EU institutions should 
not follow a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Rules must thus be crafted along basic 
principles and then refined on a sectoral basis. In addition, emphasis on open 
standards may be justified only where the market can accommodate a single 
standard and there is no competition between different standards. In all other 
cases, the market should be allowed to pick up the best standard.  
 
19. A more effective governance for EU standardisation policy  
The time for having three European standardisation bodies has passed. The 
increasingly blurred boundaries between markets and standard types calls for 
enhanced cooperation and even common governance, possibly leading to a 
single EU standards agency that replaces CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. 
 
20. Clearer competition rules  
The European Commission should provide policy documents that:  
• clarify the relationship between standard-setting organisations and 
intellectual property rights (IPRs);  
• provide general guidance on standards practices (e.g. disclosure regimes, 
‘FRAND’ licensing, transfer of IPRs) and  
• support the creation of pro-competitive, independently administrated 
patent pools. 
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CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT 
INNOVATION POLICY: 
BOOSTING EU COMPETITIVENESS 
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
INTRODUCTION. TOWARDS EUROPE 2020 
he word “innovation” lies increasingly at the core of the EU agenda. 
European institutions – both at EU and national level – repeatedly 
state that a sound innovation policy is key to recovering EU 
competitiveness, which lagged behind other areas of the world even before 
the financial crisis hit the world in 2008-09. The Lisbon strategy in 2000 
already set very ambitious goals to unlock the potential for EU 
competitiveness, but year on year, EU institutions have gradually realised 
that those goals were not going to be achieved any time soon. Today, while 
launching the new EU strategy for a smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, the new European Commission puts even more emphasis on 
innovation, and one of the Commissioners has been given a specific 
mandate to deal with innovation.  
Available data are not reassuring. As shown below, in Figure 1, the 
gap between the EU15 and the United States in terms of expenditure in 
R&D has been in place since the early 1980s. 
T 
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Figure 1. Gross domestic expenditure in R&D (share of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Kristian Uppenberg, presentation at the first Task Force meeting, 18 September 2009. 
 
When we observe the difference between the US and the EU in terms 
of business sector R&D spending broken down by sector, the gap emerges 
in particular in the ICT and the commercial services sectors. In particular, 
ICT is currently the determinant of approximately one half of EU 
productivity increases, but is at the same time also the main determinant of 
the productivity gap between the US and the EU.  
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Figure 2. Business R&D expenditure in the US, the EU and Japan (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Figure 3. Business sector spending in R&D, by sector 
(% of the industry value added) 
 
Source: Kristian Uppenberg, presentation at the first Task Force meeting, 18 September 2009, 
OECD data. 
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An important issue is the ability of the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) to reach dynamic and innovative small firms and help them grow 
through early-stage financing. Currently the EIB finds it very challenging to 
reach SMEs due to the large size of the total loan volume it manages 
compared to the relatively small number of officers in charge of their 
management. This problem should be addressed, possibly also with the 
help of member states, by further developing instruments that allow for 
aggregation of local initiatives, such as clustering, to unlock the potential of 
innovative SMEs.  
This constraint reflects a more general situation, in which SMEs suffer 
from a chronic lack of support for innovative investments, in particular due 
to difficulties in accessing both public and private sources of funding. 
Figure 4 below shows the results of a recent survey of stakeholders, in 
which more than 96% of the surveyed respondents considered that lack of 
access to finance innovation and growth is an important barrier for SMEs.  
Figure 4. Key barriers to access to finance according to stakeholders 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/swd_effectiveness.pdf  
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Box 1. Key enabling technologies 
On 30 September 2009, the European Commission adopted a Communication 
on “Preparing for our future: developing a common strategy for key enabling 
technologies in the EU” (COM(2009)512 final, 30.09.2009). Key enabling 
technologies (KETs) are defined by the following features: i) they are 
knowledge-intensive (high R&D and capital expenditure); ii) they are 
associated with highly-skilled employment; iii) they are multi-disciplinary, 
cutting across many technology areas; iv) they create multiplier effects and v) 
they enable innovation and are of systemic relevance to economies.  
KETs are important for several reasons:  
• They are the driving force behind the development of goods and 
services.  
• They are at the forefront of competitiveness, innovation and the EU 
knowledge-based economy.  
• They modernise the industrial base and further strengthen the research 
base.  
• They create related eco-systems of SMEs.  
Against this background, the Commission highlighted the need to 
develop a strategic approach for KETs, especially since the EU has good R&D 
capacities in some KETs but is not as successful in commercialising results. 
Although several member states and other regions have started to identify 
enabling technologies that are relevant to their future competitiveness, 
differences exist among member states on what should be regarded as KETs, 
and there is no shared understanding of the importance of KETs. Thus, a more 
strategic approach is required to deploy these technologies in the EU. In 
addition, this strategy for making the EU competitive must be achieved while 
maintaining openness in the EU economy.  
Also the conclusions of the Competitiveness Council of 28 May 2009 
“welcomed the Commission’s initiative to develop a proactive policy for 
enabling high-technologies”. Specifically, the Communication tries to identify 
the KETs that strengthen the EU’s industrial and innovation capacity to 
address the societal challenges ahead, and proposes a set of measures to 
improve the related framework conditions.  
Different performance indicators have been selected for different KETs. 
At the initial stage, there is a screening of the common high-tech areas at 
member state level. Following this, there are economic criteria based on 
economic potential, the value-adding enabling role (innovation and 
productivity enabler as well as potential for positive spillovers), technology 
intensity and capital intensity. Based on these objective criteria the most 
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promising examples of KETs can be selected. The following five KETs have 
been identified in the 2009 Communication. 
• Nano-technology holds the promise of leading to the development of 
smart nano- and micro-devices and systems and to radical 
breakthroughs in vital fields such as health care, energy, environment 
and manufacturing. 
• Micro- and nano-electronics, including semiconductors, are essential for 
all goods and services that need intelligent control in sectors as diverse 
as automotive and transportation, aeronautics and space. Smart 
industrial control systems permit more efficient management of 
electricity generation, storage, transport and consumption through 
intelligent electrical grids and devices. 
• Photonics is a multi-disciplinary domain dealing with light, 
encompassing its generation, detection and management. Among other 
things, it provides the technological basis for the economical conversion 
of sunlight to electricity, which is important for the production of 
renewable energy and a variety of electronic components and 
equipment, such as photodiodes, LEDs and lasers. 
• Advanced materials offer major improvements in a wide variety of 
different fields, e.g. in aerospace, transport, building and health care. 
They facilitate recycling, lowering the carbon footprint and energy 
demand and limiting the need for raw materials that are scarce in 
Europe. 
• Biotechnology brings cleaner and sustainable process alternatives for 
industrial and agro-food operations. It will, for example, allow the 
progressive replacement of non-renewable materials currently used in 
various industries with renewable resources. The scope of applications, 
however, is just at the beginning. 
Once KETs have been identified, public intervention may follow, but this 
requires a comprehensive EU policy in this field. Examples of possible policy 
actions include focusing on innovation for KETS, improving the 
commercialisation of R&D, reducing fragmentation of EU policies, improving 
state aid for research, combining deployment policies with climate change 
policies, improving trade conditions, increasing venture capital, increasing the 
availability of skilled labour and enhancing international cooperation. In more 
in detail, short-term solutions include better application of existing state aid 
rules, a level international playing field and improved access to finance. In the 
long term, a high-level expert group could be established to assess the 
competitiveness situation of KETs, analyse R&D capacity and propose policy 
recommendations.  
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1.1 EU initiatives to boost innovation  
In December 2008, the European Council called for the elaboration of a 
European Innovation Plan to contribute to the competitiveness of the EU’s 
industry and to strengthen economic recovery. Since then, the European 
Commission has undertaken preparatory work on possible policy 
measures. Recent initiatives include:  
• various preparatory policy documents, communications and staff 
working documents in particular, the Communication “Reviewing 
Community innovation policy in a changing world”;1 
• other policy papers covering specific areas, such as design for 
innovation, innovation in services, access to finance, the Lead Market 
Initiative and Key Enabling Technologies;2  
• a business panel on future European innovation policy that provided 
a set of recommendations from a business perspective on priorities 
for future EU innovation policy; 
• a public consultation on the European Innovation Plan, which led to 
215 responses from universities and research institutions, companies, 
governments, non-governmental organisations and individuals; 
• a consultation on the review of European standardisation, coupled 
with the creation of an ad hoc working group (Express), which is due 
to close in May 2010; and 
• ongoing work on the Community patent and the common patent 
litigation system, which will arguably lead to future policy measures 
– the estimated saving for EU companies would reach €289 million 
per year.3 
 
                                                     
1 COM(2009)442 final, 2 September 2009. 
2 The Lead Market Initiative (LMI), launched in 2008, has identified markets for 
innovative products and services where innovation is both needed and possible 
and where the use of the above-mentioned instruments influencing the capacity to 
put new products on the market rapidly in a more focused way can make a real 
difference (bio-based products, eHealth, sustainable construction, protective 
textiles, recycling, and renewable energy). For KETs, see Box 1.  
3 See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/ 
225&format=HTML  
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Overall, these policy documents point to the need to i) simplify and 
streamline EU funding programmes; ii) enhance cooperation between 
different levels of governance, including regional, national and EU research 
and innovation programmes; iii) strengthen the knowledge triangle,4 
especially as regards education policies; (iv) focus on SMEs, which exhibit 
significant problems both in terms of awareness of existing support 
schemes and access to finance and v) focus innovation policy more towards 
emerging market needs and societal challenges, e.g. climate change and 
ageing.  
The recently presented EU 2020 strategy includes seven flagship 
initiatives, of which one hints at the need to create an ‘Innovation Union’ to 
improve framework conditions and access to finance for research and 
innovation so as to ensure that innovative ideas can be turned into 
products and services that create growth and jobs. Within this context, 
emerging initiatives include actions to strengthen EU instruments to 
support innovation (including through closer collaboration with the EIB); 
streamlining of administrative procedures to facilitate access to funding, 
particularly for SMEs; the promotion of knowledge partnerships and the 
strengthening of links between education, business, research and 
innovation, including through the EIT, and to promote entrepreneurship by 
supporting young innovative companies.  
The new flagship initiative also deals with multi-level governance 
and announces the launch of joint ‘European Innovation Partnerships’ 
between the EU and national levels to speed up the development and 
deployment of the technologies needed to meet the challenges identified. 
1.2 The governance of EU innovation policy 
The plethora of initiatives launched by the European Commission in the 
past months on issues related to innovation policy testifies at once to the 
importance of the subject, and also to the challenges that this domain of EU 
policy is facing.  As a matter of fact, the current European landscape suffers 
from considerable problems, mostly due to a lack of good governance. It is 
therefore no surprise that both public and – even most notably – private 
spending in R&D&I have not even come close to the very ambitious 
objectives set in Lisbon back in 2000. On the contrary, Europe still exhibits a 
                                                     
4 The knowledge triangle refers to the interaction between research, education and 
innovation, which are key drivers of a knowledge-based society. 
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remarkable gap with, for example the US and Japan in terms of investment 
in R&D&I.  
Public funds at EU level are available. An estimated 16.5% of the 
Community budget in the period 2007-13 is dedicated to innovation-related 
activities; however, it is spread over several programmes and under 
different management rules:  
• four centrally managed EU funding programmes (FP7, CIP, LLP and 
LIFE+) and  
• four shared managed programmes (the ERDF, ESF, EAFRD and EFF) 
have innovation among their targets.  
• Within the CIP programme, there are three separate sub-programmes, 
each with separate work programmes.  
• In addition, three programmes indirectly support innovation (TENs for 
transport and for energy, Marco Polo and IDABC/ISA for 
eGovernment). 
• The EIB supports innovation under its ‘i2i’ initiative, which aims to 
mobilise up to €50 billion over the current decade (innovation 2010 
initiative).
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Figure 6. Budget instruments  
 
Source: European Commission. 
 
In terms of governance, the EU landscape appears particularly 
complex (see also Figure 7 below): 
• Four different executive agencies support the implementation of the 
centralised RTD&I programmes + the EIF and its financial 
intermediaries for the CIP financial instruments and the FP7 RSFF. 
• 24 committees (for FP7: 19 committees/thematic configurations of 
committees, for CIP: 3, LLP: 1, LIFE+: 1) deal with the programming 
and monitoring of implementation of the centrally managed 
programmes directly targeting innovation.  
• There are 386 operational programmes under the ERDF and ESF 
that contain an innovation component. For each of them a managing 
authority is in charge (mostly a regional or national ministry or body; 
for the territorial cooperation programmes these can be joint technical 
secretariats, like the JTS for INTERREG IV C) and each is overseen by 
a monitoring committee that includes the Commission as observer. 
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• There are seven DGs/Commissioners in charge (RTD, ENTR, INFSO, 
TREN, ENV, ECFIN, EAC) of the centralised programmes. 
• plus another five if the shared managed funds and indirect 
innovation support are taken into account (REGIO, EMPL, AGRI, 
FISH, DIGIT).  
• plus another six if the indirect impact on the innovation-related 
programmes and policies is taken into account [COMP (state aid), 
MARKT (IPR, public procurement), SANCO (health & safety 
regulations), TAXUD (fiscal incentives), ESTAT (statistics, 
community innovation survey) and JLS (mobility of 3rd country 
researchers and immigration of high-skilled workers)]. 
Figure 7. The complex decision-making system of EU innovation policy 
 
Source: European Commission. 
 
Against this background, for the potential beneficiaries there is no 
single information or entry point to the different EU support programmes 
and a panoply of different application forms and management rules at EU, 
national and regional level. This leads to a lack of clear political leadership 
and strategic orientation. 
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1.2.1 The European Investment Bank 
The European Investment Bank Group already leverages EU budgetary 
funds in support of R&D&I investment. In addition to cross-border venture 
capital and technology transfer support via the European Investment Fund 
(EIF), the EIB could consider widening the scope of applications, in 
particular by broadening and deepening risk-sharing operations, to include 
for instance innovative services and demand-side measures, such as the 
Lead Market Initiative or ‘pre-commercial procurement’.5 
Figure 8 below summarises the different sources of EU funding 
available by differentiating between the different phases of growth of a 
firm.  
Figure 8. EIB’s funding instruments 
2
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Source: Presentation by Harald Gruber at the CEPS Task Force. 
 
                                                     
5 ‘Pre-commercial procurement’ describes “an approach to procuring R&D services 
other than those where the benefits accrue exclusively to the contracting authority 
for its use in the conduct of its own affairs, on condition that the service provided 
is wholly remunerated by the contracting authority”. See the Commission 
Communication Pre-commercial procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable 
high quality public services in Europe, COM (2007) 799 final, 14.12.2007.   
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Box 2. The EIB Risk-sharing Finance Facility 
An example of funding available for innovative firms during the development 
phase is the EIB’s risk-sharing finance facility (RSFF), one component of the 
EIB strategy that aims at offering loans in conjunction with banks. The problem 
with that instrument is that the EIB is by itself constrained in reaching SMEs, 
because the loans that are directly managed by the bank are too big to apply to 
SMEs. This is to some extent mitigated by the fact that RSFF credit lines have 
been set up with commercial banks which have a retailing role for SME 
financing. However, more coordination with national banks and investors 
should help to bridge financing gaps. This would be very important for 
innovative firms in the development stage, as the RSFF may be attractive to 
them for many reasons, including the following: 
1. Highly attractive terms and conditions (AAA rating and non-for-profit 
pricing) 
2. Long maturities of up to 10 years or more 
3. Direct EIB participation of up to €200 million per transaction (depending 
on rating) 
4. Strong technology/industry expertise 
5. EIB does not sell assets on the secondary market (buy and hold strategy) 
6. No cross-selling (just long-term lender) 
7. Signalling effect: EIB as a quality stamp 
8. Debt and mezzanine debt product 
The EIB does not generally offer the RSFF product to firms with high 
credit standing as they are better served with other products, such as senior 
investment loans. RSFF instead is used to fuel innovation by sub-investment-
grade rated firms (Moody’s BBB- or less), as innovative firms often fall into 
these rating categories. The EIB chooses firms based on projects that appear 
mature enough to demonstrate the capacity to repay debt on the basis of a 
credible business plan. 
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Figure 9. RSFF approvals to date 
 
Source: Harald Gruber, EIB. 
 
1.3 Structure of the report 
Given the turbulent state of the European debate on innovation policy, 
with a proliferation of policy initiatives, public consultations and ad hoc 
working groups, the Centre for European Policy Studies decided to launch 
a Task Force on innovation policy in mid-2009. The Task Force met five 
times between September 2009 and May 2010, and brought together 
representatives of EU institutions (the European Commission, the EIB) and 
the European Patent Office, industry representatives, practitioners and 
scholars to discuss how to revive the EU approach to innovation policy and 
strengthen existing instruments to ensure that the framework conditions to 
unleash the potential for innovation are in place at EU level.  
The main topics covered by the Task Force were the overall approach 
to the re-launch of EU innovation policy, as well as the governance of EU 
innovation policy. In addition, we have dedicated ad hoc sessions to three 
specific issues: the Community patent, the transfer of climate-related 
technologies (CRTs), and EU standardisation policy.   
Accordingly, the remainder of this report is structured as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the need to develop a new approach to EU innovation 
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policy that is at once integrated and comprehensive, coordinated, demand-
driven, market-based, responsive and accountable. Section 3 illustrates the 
Task Force recommendations as regards the Community patent. Section 4 
contains the findings of the Task Force on issues related to technology 
transfer, particularly in the context of climate-friendly technologies. Section 
5 explores potential avenues for reform of EU standardisation policy. 
Section 6 briefly concludes.  
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2. A NEW APPROACH TO INNOVATION 
POLICY IN THE EU 
2.1 Innovation is a changing concept 
The data reported in the previous section show that Europe is facing a 
structural problem of ‘innovation stagnation’. Available data testify to a 
European ‘lag’ vis-à-vis the United States, Asia and several emerging 
economies in terms of research, development and innovation (R&D&I). The 
recent Innovation Scoreboard 2009 has shown positive signs in some 
regions, but overall innovative investments by businesses still appear to be 
relatively weak, especially if compared to the US and Japan.6 Europe must 
focus on unlocking its full innovation potential in the years to come, to the 
benefit of EU citizens. 
The CEPS Task Force discussed possible ways to overcome this 
problem. The first conclusion reached is that any solution must be developed 
with due attention to the changing global environment of innovation. This means 
that Europe must realise that innovation patterns around the world are 
changing and pose new challenges to the old continent’s ability to compete 
internationally. In more detail: 
• R&D&I activities are increasingly internationalised. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the sophistication of production abroad has 
only recently increased. Second, as stated, there is an increased desire 
to have R&D closer to customers in foreign markets. Available data 
                                                     
6 See European Innovation Scoreboard 2009 at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
newsroom/cf/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=5714&userservice_id=1&re
quest.id=0   
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shown by Task Force participants show that companies are 
internationalising their research and innovation activities following 
two broad strategies: i) an asset-exploiting strategy where firms seek 
knowledge about new markets to customise products and extend the 
expertise generated at home; and ii) an asset-seeking strategy, whereby 
firms gather new knowledge and tap into the resources of a host 
country. Examples of R&D internationalisation include the creation of 
overseas R&D centres; alliances with local companies and 
universities; mergers and acquisitions of local firms; and increasing 
research intensity of foreign production facilities. 
The three main players are the EU, US and Japan, but it should 
be noted that Asia is entering the process. With respect to the EU, US 
and Japan, the US appears to be a major destination and the EU a 
major source of R&D investments. Also, European companies 
perform about 30% of R&D outside the EU.  
Data presented at the Task Force meetings are based on 
evidence of collaboration between EU and non-EU inventors and 
between EU and non-EU applicants and cross-border ownership of 
inventions in the total EU ICT-related inventions, in the period 1990-
2007. The main findings are that: 
o The level of internationalisation of inventive activities, while 
being rather low, has steadily increased over time. 
o The level of internationalisation of inventive activities in ICT is 
and has been significantly higher compared to the average for 
all technologies. 
o In international collaboration in ICT, US firms seem to be more 
active than EU firms. 
o Inventive collaboration in ICT R&D with Asian economies is 
still relatively low, but increasing. 
o The level of US-Asia collaboration is significantly higher than 
EU-Asia, particularly after 2000.  
A NEW APPROACH TO INNOVATION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 29 
Figure 10. Evidence of the internationalisation of R&D 
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Source: Daniel Nepelski, JRC from EPO PATSTAT and own calculations. 
 
• The EU is still very fragmented when it comes to innovative potential and 
output. The recent European Innovation Scoreboard 2009 has 
highlighted that EU member states can be divided into at least four 
different groups: i) innovation leaders, which include Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK; ii) innovation followers, 
comprising Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia; iii) moderate innovators, 
which includes the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain; and iv) 
catching-up countries, which comprise Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania.  
At regional level, the situation is even more fragmented. The 
level of innovation in regions varies considerably across almost all 
EU countries.  
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Figure 11. Regional innovation performance in the EU 
 
 
Source: European Innovation scoreboard 2009. 
 
The fragmentation of innovation performance is also a mirror 
image of the persisting absence of a real internal market for many of 
the most innovative sectors, including, most notably, the services 
sector. Financial markets are fragmented and the level of regulation 
(e.g. taxation) varies across countries. While a degree of diversity is 
required, a total lack of harmonisation prevents cross-border venture 
capital investment and the creation of funds in areas where financing 
for innovation is needed. Furthermore, the obstacles to individuals’ 
mobility (in terms of taxation, portability of pension benefits, etc.) 
prevent professionals and business angels from reaching new 
markets and establishing their business where opportunities are still 
unexploited. This calls for urgent action at the EU level to ensure that 
the free movement of capital and services is finally achieved.  
A NEW APPROACH TO INNOVATION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 31 
• The concept of ‘open innovation’ permeates most of the recent policy 
discussions at international level. As recently reported also by the 
OECD, “the organisation of innovative activities (technological as 
well as non-technological) across firm boundaries is clearly on the 
increase, with more balance between internal and external sources of 
innovation ... Industries such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals and 
information and communication technology (ICT) typically show 
high levels of open innovation”.7 Open innovation implies, inter alia, 
the use of internal and external R&D sources; openness to external 
business models, a variety of IP generators and collaborations (SMEs, 
academics, etc.), and a proactive IP asset management. This is leading 
to an increase in the number of companies collaborating in innovative 
activities.8 At EU level, this new concept poses a number of 
challenges, such as clarifying the scope and enforcement of IPRs to 
reduce transaction costs in creating collaborative networks; 
coordinating and tailoring public support schemes to reflect the 
evolving nature of innovative endeavours; and removing barriers to 
the circulation and licensing of ideas across EU member states. The 
role of patents, technology transfer and standardisation is key in this 
respect, as will be discussed below.9  
                                                     
7 See Open innovation http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/44/41446671.pdf.  
8 OECD innovation strategy http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/42/43381127.pdf 
9 See below, Sections 2, 3 and 4.  
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Figure 12. Traditional vs. open innovation 
 
Source: Chesbrough (2009) – quoted by Jackie Hunter, 5th meeting of the Task Force. 
2.2 A new approach to EU innovation policy 
The changing nature and scope of global innovation activities creates very 
significant consequences for EU innovation policy, requiring a substantial 
review of the pillars of EU innovation policy, involving both the scope and 
the governance of innovation at the EU and national level. 
The CEPS Task Force discussed the issue in-depth. The debate led to 
the definition of a new EU innovation policy that is integrated and 
comprehensive; coordinated and multi-level; demand-driven and (where 
possible) co-regulated; focused and market-based; responsive and 
accountable. Below, we explore their attributes in more detail.  
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2.2.1 Tomorrow’s innovation policy: integrated, market-based, 
demand-driven 
The problem to be solved (demand from the market and society) should be 
the starting point for innovation policy; scientific questions cannot be the 
only drivers of innovation. This implies that the whole innovation cycle 
should be taken into account, including all the different actors in the 
innovation chain: industry, academia, public and private financing 
organisations, NGOs, society and citizens, politicians, policy-makers etc. At 
the same time, both the supply and the demand for innovation should lie at 
the heart of EU policy-making. The discussion should go towards accepting 
innovation as a transversal concept cutting across all sectors of economic, 
social and political activity, to cover the different kinds of innovation. 
Demand-side measures, such as the Lead Market Initiative and pre-
commercial public procurement are powerful tools that should be 
developed to create the market incentives for innovation. 
Innovation essentially takes place in markets, and market players know best 
where consumer needs and technology developments are leading. This would 
justify a change in perspective from a simplistic, supply-side approach (i.e. 
pumping innovation into the market) to a more demand-driven approach 
as far as new applications and societal challenges are concerned, including 
undertaking measures for the simplification of regulations surrounding 
innovation procurement. 
From a demand-side perspective: 
• Public-private partnership schemes (PPPs) should be extended and promoted 
as the governing principle in all cases in which strong societal needs are at 
stake. In PPPs, market players are able to avoid the current 
fragmentation of competences at EU level by involving all relevant 
DGs of the European Commission and all competent players from 
other EU institutions in a global dialogue that focuses on the 
industry, EU citizens, and global technology challenges.  
• In designing and shaping the new Framework Programme (FP8) market 
players should be involved to make sure that the demand perspective is 
adequately taken into account in deciding where public money 
should be spent in order to add value. 
From a supply-side viewpoint: 
• The supply of public support to (and risk capital for) innovation must be 
ensured.  There is a general need to expand private investment and 
public financial support, and the amount of risk capital from different 
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sources; to innovation for Europe to become competitive. We must 
expand the public EU and member state (industry will follow) 
support to innovation and research programmes to address both 
societal challenges and general competitive challenges facing the 
industrial base of Europe using new, revised existing (mentioned) 
and existing (like CIP) programmes. In addition, we must expand the 
public EU and member state and private capital to innovation by: 
o Establishing an integrated venture capital market in Europe 
o Expanding the permanent risk-sharing products of EIB 
o Developing tax incentives to support investments in R&D and 
innovation, especially for young innovative companies. 
• The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) is to be a key 
driver of sustainable European growth and competitiveness through the 
stimulation of world-leading innovations with a positive impact on economy 
and society. The EIT is the first European initiative to integrate fully 
the three sides of the ‘knowledge triangle’ (Higher Education, 
Research and Business-Innovation) and its mission is to grow and 
capitalise on the innovation capacity and capability of actors from the 
EU and beyond. In order to unleash the full potential of European 
innovation there is today an increasing need for: (i) ensuring 
continuity between the results of projects funded by the European 
Research Council and activities undertaken by the EIT; and (ii) a 
better alignment of both European and national level initiatives, in 
that all contribute towards the Europe 2020 vision and goals.   
• A key goal for the future should be to scale up the present EIT (knowledge 
triangle) approach which aims to join nodes of regional clusters of academia, 
institutes and business in pan-European knowledge and innovation 
communities (KICs).  This triangle should focus on the following:  
o Addressing major challenges and opportunities; 
o Creating, capturing and transferring breakthroughs into 
business opportunities; 
o Forming effective governance, leadership and networks; 
o Exchanging and coordinating research and incubating efforts; 
o Exchanging the build-up of skills and educational programmes 
e.g. Master programmes throughout the EU27.  
• In addition to cross-border venture capital and technology transfer support 
via the European Investment Fund (EIF), the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) could consider widening the scope of applications, in particular by 
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broadening and deepening risk-sharing operations, to include, for 
instance, innovative services and demand side measures, such as the 
lead market initiative or pre-commercial procurement. An important 
issue is the EIB’s ability to reach dynamic and innovative small firms 
and help them grow through early-stage financing. Currently the EIB 
finds it very challenging to also reach SMEs due to the large size of 
the total loan volume it manages compared to the relatively small 
number of officers in charge of their management. This problem 
should be addressed, possibly also with the help of member states, by 
further developing instruments that allow for aggregation of local 
initiatives, such as clustering, to really unlock the potential of 
innovative SMEs.  
2.2.2 A coordinated, multi-level innovation policy 
Governance is about much more than what happens within the 
Commission, even than what happens at EU level. Indeed, the money the 
EU spends on innovation is only a fraction of what countries spend.10 This 
calls for the following main recommendations: 
• Apply the subsidiarity principle. The EU should only stimulate 
innovation where there is an evident EU added value, to be clearly 
demonstrated through an impact assessment. For instance, this could 
be the case where there is a strong need to link innovation policy with 
other EU policy priorities (climate, energy, health etc).  
• Empower a EU agency to manage the several funding instruments available 
for innovation and research, in order to exploit the potential synergies 
between them and streamline communication with stakeholders, thus 
avoiding the current ‘spontaneous disorder’, in which too many 
funding tools appear sub-additive rather than self-reinforcing. 
• Coordinate the different levels of governance better. There should be 
clearer and more effective coordination between member states and 
EU policies and decision-making when it comes to R&D processes. 
As observed in other areas and debates (e.g. telecoms, competition 
policy, financial services, etc.) it would be possible to establish a 
centralized/coordinated policy at EU level (see also point above), 
                                                     
10 Commission R&D funding comprises less than 5% of total public research 
spending in the EU, and less than 2% of total R&D spending, public and private. 
See; inter alia, the first ERAB report, Preparing Europe for a New Renaissance, 2009.  
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which is then implemented locally by national authorities, provided 
the commitment is credible, and the reverse relationship or balance is 
also possible or appropriate depending on the area concerned, the 
relevant spillover effects and the incentives.   
• Ensure that member states allocate a larger share of their resources to 
support super-critical programmes/instruments coordinated at European 
level (e.g., Framework Programmes, PPPs, Joint Technology 
Initiatives, ERANET+, ELSA, voluntary JP, CIP, Eureka, etc.). 
• Ensure that member states contribute to the monitoring and evaluation of 
the performance of research and innovation projects by collecting 
information and data using common indicators.  
2.2.3 Taking innovation seriously: improving governance through 
accountability and coordination 
Putting innovation at the core of the EU policy-making process cannot only 
be a declaration of intent. At the same time, achieving a ‘new Renaissance’ 
for Europe would be impossible if the governance system that backs 
innovation support schemes is feudal. Against this backdrop, the CEPS 
Task Force welcomes the fact that the European Commission will formally 
establish a subgroup of at least eight EU commissioners with a stake in 
innovation policy (chaired by Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, the EU 
Commissioner for research, innovation and science), which will work on a 
new research and innovation strategy due to be published in the autumn. 
Looking at the near future, there are additional measures that can 
improve leadership, ownership, accountability, coordination and 
governance. These include: 
• Opening the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) to a representative of DG 
Science, Technology and Innovation (STI). This way, the IAB would be 
able to send back proposals that have not sufficiently considered the 
impact of submitted new Commission policies on innovation and 
research. A representative from DG STI or any other IAB member in 
charge of representing EU innovation could also suggest 
methodologies developed by EU-funded programmes, which could 
be used in impact assessments to evaluate ex ante the impact of the 
proposed new measures on innovation.  
• Increasing and improving the participation of officers in charge of research 
and innovation policy in Impact Assessment Steering Groups. This should 
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guarantee that impacts on innovation are considered also at an early 
stage of the policy-making process.  
• Developing indicators that track progress in the field of innovation policy 
and allow for an evaluation of the performance of policy measures in place. It 
is paramount that the performance in innovation is measured 
according to standard indicators, not subject to arbitrary 
interpretations and manipulations across Europe. The experience 
with the European Innovation Scoreboard – based on 29 indicators – 
is a useful starting point in this direction, and should be 
complemented by other tools currently used at the international level 
(e.g. the OECD Oslo manual, the tools developed by FP7 projects 
such as INNODRIVE).11 The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
Commission should ideally be in charge of this task. Indicators 
should also break down different types of innovation: for example, a 
recent OECD report suggests that there are four different kinds of 
innovation: two technological ‘product’ and ‘process’ innovations 
(empirically the latter is far more important than the former despite 
what many think); and also two non-technological ‘marketing’ and 
‘organisational’ types of innovation. One question in the EU context 
is what the financing constraints are in these areas; whether they are 
the same or different and whether EU policies and instruments deal 
with this difference. 
• Adopting follow-on monitoring and evaluation strategies. The 
implementation of innovation policies should be monitored ex post 
and evaluated according to the intended purposes to be achieved, 
with the help of member states (See Section 2.2.2 above). 
• Coordinating innovation and research policy with other EU policy objectives 
already at the budget allocation stage, for example by allocating funds to 
projects and technology platforms that promise to solve today’s and 
tomorrow’s policy challenges. For example, there has been a lively 
debate over Europe’s huge investment in the ITER project, which 
accounts for the bulk of funding for energy research in the EU 
budget: even disregarding the riskiness of the project, its weak 
governance and the even weaker commitment of some of the other 
                                                     
11 See the OECD Oslo manual, “Guidelines for collecting and interpreting 
innovation data”, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/61/2367580.pdf. And see 
INNODRIVE’s activities at http://innodrive.org/  
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partners, it is impossible to ignore the mismatch between the timing 
of results for ITER (2040 at the earliest) and the ambitious EU goals 
set in terms of reducing CO2 emissions by 2020.  
• Establishing a general principle at any review stage whereby policy-
makers i) should mandatorily assess whether policy and governance 
are aligned; and whereby ii) if they propose a change in policy 
and/or the introduction of a new instrument, they should 
immediately consider candidate policies or instruments to drop (a so-
called ‘one in, one out’ approach). 
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3. PATENT LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE  
3.1 A jagged system 
The European Union does not have a unified patent system. Firms, 
institutions and individuals can obtain patent protection either through 
national patent procedures or through the European Patent Office (EPO). 
National patent offices grant national patents with limited territorial 
protection, based on domestic (substantive and procedural) patent laws 
that have a sufficient degree of harmonisation (thanks to international 
conventions on patent protection adopted by most states in Europe and in 
the world).12 Since markets are expanding, national applicants may find 
national patent protection inadequate and usually they also apply abroad, 
through international or regional filing procedures. 
The EPO is an administrative office within the European Patent 
Organisation, created by a number of contracting states with an 
international convention.13 All member states of the European Union are 
contracting states to this convention. Its membership exceeds the 
boundaries of the European Union and also includes other European 
countries like Switzerland, some Former Yugoslav Republics like Croatia 
                                                     
12 The main international instrument is the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, of March 20, 1883, revised several times. 
13 The Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 as amended 
by the act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and by decisions of the 
Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation of 21 December 1978, 
13 December 1994, 20 October 1995, 5 December 1996, 10 December 1998 and 
27 October 2005, further amended by the London Agreement in 2000. 
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and Macedonia, and even Turkey.14 The EPO does not grant a truly single 
‘European’ patent, but provides for a unified application procedure valid in 
all EPO member states. The office is in charge of a centralised procedure for 
obtaining patent protection in the contracting states by following a single 
route, thereby simplifying the application procedure in relation to parallel 
national application procedures in each member state. Eventually the 
applicant receives a title of property that is a bundle of national patents. 
This feature of the European patent system implies that certain substantive 
law issues are dealt with under national laws, for example claims of 
validity and infringement. Each national case has its own independent life 
and outcomes may vary.  
This being the situation, neither of the two routes appears to be 
perfectly complete, since the national route requires multiple applications 
and brings national patents under distinct and parallel procedures. The 
EPO route, on the other hand, is simpler from a procedural standpoint in 
the application phase, even though the life of the issued patents eventually 
depends on national experiences. It is disputable whether national 
procedures are easier than the EPO one.  
It may be seen as a paradox that the European Union lacks a unified 
patent system; European firms have the opportunity to compete over an 
internal market with no internal barriers, but when it comes to patents they 
experience certain fragmentation costs.15 The remedy could be the prospect 
of an EU patent. Since the Lisbon strategy, the European Commission and 
the European Council are seeking to implement an EU patent system, but 
results so far are wanting.16 
                                                     
14 From 1 May 2010, the European patent can be granted to up to 37 contracting 
states. 
15 The European Parliament of Enterprises (Eurochambres) debated and voted 
“that the absence of a Community patent harms European business” on 14 October 
2008. 
16 The goal to obtain a Community patent while improving the existing systems 
was declared by the Commission in its Communication More Research and 
Innovation – Investing for Growth and Employment: A Common Approach, COM(2005) 
448 final, on October 12, 2005, p. 7. Considerable efforts have been made recently to 
approach the final result, as witnessed by the Council Conclusions of 4 December 
2009, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ 
pressdata/en/intm/111744.pdf. 
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It is disputable whether patents are the best way to protect 
innovation and the answer is not absolute, depending rather on industries, 
technologies and the kind of innovation in general. But it is a fact that EU 
firms face higher costs and greater complexities than competitors in the US 
or Japan. As a consequence, they have a reduced propensity to resort to 
patent protection. US firms have 45% more patents than EU ones, while 
Japanese firms have 209% more patents than EU firms. 
The current situation is partly fragmented and produces certain 
shortcomings that may create difficulties for applicants (especially as far as 
SMEs are concerned) and should be eliminated in any future, truly 
European, patent system. Such shortcomings are covered in the following 
points. 
3.1.1 Costs 
Patent applicants usually face three different orders of costs, such as those 
for i) prosecution, including professional fees, from the application to the 
grant; ii) translation of granted European patents, for the patent to have 
effect in national jurisdictions; and iii) renewal, until the patent expires, 
which is usually 20 years from the filing of the application.17 
Over the years, studies conducted in Europe in comparison with 
other regional patent systems have highlighted the following:18 
- Costs to patent an invention in 13 EU member states is more than 13 
times higher than in the US or Japan 
- Renewal fees for 10 years’ protection in 13 member states are 7 times 
higher than in the US and Japan 
- European patents are generally validated only in about 6 or fewer 
(larger) member states because of cost. 
Such data shows that companies with a large share of their business 
in the US or Japan receive a substantial advantage from their own patent 
                                                     
17 As a matter of fact, a small number of patents is kept alive until the very last 
moment. At some point in time, the cost of renewal outweighs the advantages 
derived from sales of patented items. 
18 A detailed account of costs and potential savings by a Community patent system 
can be read in Jérôme Danguy and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Cost-
benefit analysis of the Community patent, Bruegel Working Paper, 08/2009. 
42 | PATENT LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE 
system, which results in a comparative advantage with respect to 
companies whose business is basically in the European markets. 
One of the major sources of cost is related to translation. The failure 
to adopt one single language for patents implies the need to use translation 
services when applying to certain foreign jurisdictions and such costs are 
incurred regardless of the route (whether national or through the European 
Patent Organisation) chosen. This problem has been significantly reduced 
recently under the European Patent Convention, since the London 
Agreement, signed by the EPC Contracting States on October 17, 2000,19 
entered into force in 2008 (May 1st), with the purpose of reducing 
translation costs. Under the London Agreement, states that adopt one of 
the official languages of the EPC (French, German or English) are no longer 
required to provide a translation into the other two languages, whereas (2) 
any state party having no official language in common with one of the 
official languages of the EPO shall dispense with the translation 
requirements provided for in Article 65, paragraph 1, of the European 
Patent Convention, if the European patent has been granted in the official 
language of the EPO prescribed by that state, or translated into that 
language and supplied under the conditions provided for in Article 65, 
paragraph 1, of the European Patent Convention. However, the London 
Agreement is currently in force in only 15 of the 37 EPC Contracting States.  
3.1.2 Legal uncertainty 
Since there is no such thing as an EU-wide patent, patents granted in 
Europe are national titles only. Because certain substantive laws are those 
of the granting states, jurisdiction also remains national. Although there 
could be unified jurisdiction in the absence of a Community patent, the 
failure to adopt a unified patent system has indeed delayed any move 
towards a unified system of courts. This situation can in principle be a 
source of legal uncertainty, as national judges can invalidate or reform the 
national portion of a European patent, thus making the protection not 
uniform across countries. In practice this effect is reduced, because the 
national substantive laws are to a large extent harmonised and because 
judges give, whenever possible, preference to a harmonised jurisdiction. 
                                                     
19 The full name is:”Agreement on the application of Article 65 of the Convention 
on the Grant of European Patents.” 
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Nevertheless, studies have shown over the years that in exceptional 
cases national jurisdiction can arrive at inconsistent results with respect to 
the same European patent, thus creating uncertainties as to the actual reach 
of the protection. Quite paradoxically, while the EU aims at a unified 
internal market, European patents are still subject to a jagged protection.20 
3.1.3 Incongruities and complexities 
The same uncertainty with regard to litigation exists even before, during 
prosecution of the patent. Indeed, the choice between two routes is a 
technical one, requiring advice by experts that need to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of each route. Furthermore, the kind of protection afforded to 
subject matters can be different; one remarkable example being that of 
utility models that, unlike patents for invention, cannot be granted by the 
EPO. This fragmentation and the complexities of the system, coupled with 
the costs and the risk of costly litigation, leave European SMEs with the 
impression of having large parts of Europe in which they cannot establish a 
market. 
On the other hand, the existence of alternative routes can provide 
freedom of choice for the applicants, which can adapt the requested scope 
of protection and the associated costs to their business requirements, which 
is of particular advantage for SMEs. 
3.1.4 Inconsistent quality 
The quality of patent protection is another important aspect.21 Patents are 
often referred to as monopolies. This view might be exaggerated, since the 
patent owner is not a monopolist, even though the patentee enjoys 
exclusive rights that can resemble to those of a firm with some market 
power. The traditional economic literature justifies patent protection as an 
ex post incentive to inventive activities and to investments in research by 
                                                     
20 Two cases are often taken as an example of inconsistent results: the Sara 
Lee/Phillips Electronics case and the Document Security Systems v. European Central 
Bank case, where the rulings of judges differed across member states. 
21 Important papers and contributions have been produced on this topic. For 
instance, see R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent Quality Mechanism, Public Law 
and Legal Theory, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Research Paper No. 09-
22, subsequently published as 157 U. Penn. L. Rev. 2135 (2009). 
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the innovator. In this vein, patent length and patent scope should be strictly 
related to the invention and to the idea of a reward for the inventor. 
Because of the structure of the rights, patent protection cannot be 
automatic. It rather requires a granting authority in charge of assessing the 
existence of certain positive requirements that the invention must have to 
be afforded patent exclusivity. The granting authority (patent office) 
usually prosecutes the patent application assessing, among other things, its 
novelty and its inventive step in light of the existing prior art. The notion of 
prior art is a normative one; according to the European Patent Convention 
it includes everything made available to the public before the date of the 
application and it includes patent literature (PL), such as published patent 
applications and granted patents (even if expired), and not-patent literature 
(NPL), such as scientific papers, conference proceedings, presentations, 
internet postings, books. 
There are several elements affecting patent quality, which is higher in 
Europe compared to the US.22 Those elements can be (a) substantive, such 
as (i) the definition of patentable subject matter, and (b) the definition of 
novelty and inventiveness requirements, or (c) procedural, such as (i) the 
level of fees, and (ii) the characteristics of the granting procedure.  
Eventually, the quality of the patents depends largely on the accuracy 
of the examination procedure. Patent examiners should grant patents only 
for those inventions that, after evaluation, correspond to patentable subject 
matters and are new and inventive. Low quality patents (often referred to 
as ‘junk patents’) have negative effects on the market, since the patentee 
can use them anyhow to exclude competitors and stifle genuine 
competition until someone, if any one, brings a validity action to have the 
patent declared invalid and removed by court. A decision to invalidate a 
patent is a serious and costly decision and negative incentives to initiate an 
action against an allegedly invalid patent can perpetuate the existence of 
that patent. 
                                                     
22 There is a consistent body of literature that supports this statement. See, for 
example, the Report by the US Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: 
The Proper Balance Of Competition And Patent Law And Policy, 2003 available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. Presentations by Bruno van 
Pottelsberghe and Domenico Golzio at the CEPS Task Force also confirm this 
statement. 
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If patent offices had unlimited resources, in terms of examiners, time 
and access to prior art information, there would be no problem with 
quality. Yet, the internet economy, globalisation and industrial cycles have 
been producing a growing number of patent applications. As a matter of 
fact, statistics from patent offices witness a growth in the number of 
applications that tend to be longer than in the past, and that are extended 
abroad because of globalised markets. Increased numbers and the length of 
patent applications can create backlogs in patent offices with potentially 
negative downward spiral effects: time available for the exam is reduced, 
so that the number of pending applications will expand. Other things being 
equal (that is, with given resources), quality will be inevitably affected 
since examiners will face workloads to be cleared in less time.  
Because national systems may retain different approaches to patent 
law applications (for instance, as to the patentable subject matter) and to 
examination procedures (for instance, the number of staff examiners that 
each office has), or because of different propensities by firms and 
institutions to apply for patent protections, national offices face different 
workloads and the quality of patents can be different. For example, the 
problem of the backlog (which eventually has an influence on the quality of 
patents) is very well known in the US, where Congress in working to 
improve the patent system. The situation might be different in Europe, but 
a fast-changing scenario would recommend action on this issue to prevent 
the emergence of the problem.  
To be sure, in light of the increasing importance of patents, policy-
makers should undertake all possible options to organise the internal work 
of patent offices more efficiently and effectively. Facing the challenge of the 
information revolution also means striking the right balance between 
access to the patent system and a transparent and high-quality examination 
process.  
3.1.5 Lack of EU-wide jurisdiction 
As there is no centralised jurisdiction for patent litigation, litigation of 
patents remains national, unlike litigation of other intellectual property 
rights where the European Union has union-wide systems which 
complement the existing national systems (for trademarks and design, 
which are centralised, at least as far as the examination is concerned). 
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Plurality of national jurisdictions means potential variance not only 
in the outcome of the procedure (see above) but also in costs.23 The 
European Commission highlighted such cost differences in a recent report. 
Four member states (the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany) make 
up 90% of all patent litigation in Europe, but, as is shown in the following 
table, differences in costs are astonishing.24 
Table 1. Cost of patent litigation in four member states 
Member State First Instance Court Appeal Court 
UK €150,000 to €1.5 million €150.000 to €1 million 
France €50,000 to €200,000 €40.000 to €150,000 
Netherlands €60,000 to €200,000 €40.000 to €150,000 
Germany €50,000 €90.000 
 
The level of costs has an impact both on the decision to apply for a 
patent in a given country and on the decision to act to have a patent 
declared invalid. 
First of all, the entrepreneurial decision to apply for a patent depends 
on a set of arguments, one of which is the likelihood of success in an 
enforcement action and its costs. There is an inner balance between the size 
of a company and its need for IPR protection. The smaller the business of 
an SME, the lower its need for IPR protection may be. However, when a 
business gets bigger, and IPR protection more important, costs for IPR 
protection become, due to the growing business, more and more affordable. 
In fact this is very much a self-balancing mechanism. Nevertheless, if 
litigation costs are too high, a company can still decide to enter the market, 
without patent protection, and thus save both the costs of the application 
and those of potential litigation. However, giving up patent protection for 
cost reasons can result in a loss of competitive advantage, even more in the 
                                                     
23 See David Knight, Cost of patent disputes, in Patents in Europe. Helping business 
compete in the global economy, 2008, p. 25. 
24 Data are available in the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council Enhancing the patent system in Europe, COM(2007) 165 
def, p. 7. 
A NEW APPROACH TO INNOVATION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 47 
case of SMEs. Studies have shown that the costs and complexities of 
litigation mainly hamper SMEs.25 
Second, it must be kept in mind that during litigation there are also 
ways to remove potentially invalid (due to low quality) patents, since 
alleged infringers can try to invalidate patents on the grounds of their 
validity. Such invalidation can be done either by counterclaims in litigation 
proceedings or by separate nullity or post-grant opposition proceedings. 
Opposition proceedings are extremely cheap (less than 1000 euro plus 
attorney fees), while nullity may get more expensive, depending on the 
value of the patents with the same inner cost balance as mentioned above: 
the bigger the business at stake, the more expensive the case, and the more 
money there will be to finance the case.  Yet, if litigation is too expensive, 
defendants will find it more convenient to settle a case rather than litigating 
it all the way; when this occurs, the ex post incentives to curb low quality 
patents can be altered. 
A centralised jurisdiction for patents may have the benefit of being 
more affordable than a parallel multistate litigation and of providing an 
outcome that would apply uniformly. 
On the other hand a Europe-wide unified jurisdiction will be in many 
cases (in particular those of SMEs running their business only in certain 
regions of the European Union) less affordable than the flexible, selective 
national jurisdiction as practised today where a European case usually gets 
litigated only in one country (e.g. Germany) and a contract with a 
comprehensive solution which includes all member states of the European 
Union is negotiated after conclusion of the selected national litigation.  
The higher costs of a unified system, which is due to the fact that a 
European ruling has undoubtedly a greater geographical and economic 
impact than a national one, will mandatorily affect all existing cases, 
including those that are currently litigated in a selected national system 
only, if the unified system would become mandatory and freedom of 
choice be removed for applicants. This increase of costs will predominantly 
                                                     
25 Lanjouw, Jean O., Shankerman, Mark, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are 
Small Firms Handicapped? 47 Journal of Law and Economics 45 – 74 (2004), have 
demonstrated that individuals and small firms in the US can be at a significant 
disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because of the small size of their 
portfolios.  
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affect SMEs because they lose the option to litigate a European patent only 
in a selected national system. 
3.2 Efforts to create an EU patent system 
The European Commission has been advocating for a Community patent 
since the Lisbon Strategy. Attempts to reach a truly unified European 
Patent System can be traced back to 1959. At that time, at the invitation of 
the Commission of the European Economic Community, the member states 
started working on a patent law for the Common Market that would do 
away with territorial limitations. The attempt failed in 1965 because of 
difficulties related to the failure of the UK to join the Community. 
In the meanwhile, from 1969 to 1972 a conference in Luxembourg 
delivered the draft Convention for a European System for the Grant of 
patents, which was a nucleus for the Munich Diplomatic Conference, 
leading on 5 October 1973 to the signing of the European Patent 
Convention for the creation of the European Patent Organization. 
Efforts to set up a community patent system restarted soon after. In 
1975 the Luxembourg Convention was signed (15 December 1975), 
providing for a community patent and ‘nullity boards’ within the EPO, 
whose decisions would have been open to challenge before the European 
Court of Justice. The Luxembourg Convention has never been ratified by all 
signatory states and never entered into force. Diplomatic conferences in 
1985 and 1989 followed and a Protocol on the Settlement of Litigation 
concerning the Infringement and Validity of Community Patents was 
added, but in vain.  
In 2000, the EU Commission issued a proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the Community Patent under Article 308 of the EC Treaty. 
This same legal basis had proven successful for the Community trade mark 
and Community design. The fundamental idea behind the proposed 
regulation was to have the European Patent Office as granting authority for 
the Community patent. All this would have been possible by adoption of 
the EPC by the European Union. In this way, the EPO would have been the 
granting authority on behalf of one of the signing parties (that is, the 
European Union). At the same time, the Commission envisaged a 
Community Intellectual Property Court as a centralised court for issues 
concerning infringement and validity of the unified title.  
At a later stage, relying on Articles 229a and 225a into the EC Treaty 
(introduced by Article 2 of the Treaty of Nice), the Commission introduced 
a proposal for a Council decision that should have conferred the 
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jurisdiction on a Community patent to a Community Patent Court, with 
appeals before the Court of First Instance. Basically, the main strategy was 
to vest in the European Court of Justice the jurisdiction for validity and 
infringement questions of Community patents. This ambitious attempt 
came to a halt when on 18 May 2004, the EU Council failed to adopt the 
proposal. 
Parallel efforts to have a European Patent Litigation Agreement 
(EPLA) were conducted outside the EU system in 1999-2005 by EPC 
Contracting States. They aimed at creating a European Patent Court and 
the project was certainly a good one in terms of balance between locality 
and centralisation. Yet, the EPLA turned out to be unfeasible because by 
the time the EPC states set forth the proposal, the rule-making competence 
had already passed to the EU on an exclusive basis. 
One of the critiques to the policy of the Commission has always been 
the excessive degree of centralisation in the solutions proposed. It is a fact 
that the fate of a pan-European patent system is strictly linked to the 
sentiment of a federal European Union. The future of the Lisbon Treaty will 
inevitably affect the power of the EU institution and, in this framework, the 
ability to complete the process of creating a Community patent system with 
a unified jurisdiction. 
The latest steps by the Commission were taken in 2009 and include:  
a) A Draft Agreement and Statute for new Unified Patent Litigation 
System (UPLS) to be created by “Mixed Agreement” with the EU and 
open to non-EU EPC States. 
b) A Commission Recommendation to the Council to open negotiations 
for the adoption of the Agreement creating the UPLS (March 2009). 
c) A Study on “Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis of Unified and 
Integrated Patent Litigation System” (March 2009).26 
d) A Request by Council to ECJ for Opinion on compatibility of 
Agreement with EC Treaty (June 2009). 
The main issue for this new approach of the Commission relates to 
the inclusion of non-EU states (like Turkey); a solution to which cannot be 
found by secondary EU legislation alone. This is the reason why the 
Commission switched to the international instrument of the convention 
                                                     
26 This Study estimates that an integrated patent litigation system would generate 
savings of € 148 to 289 million by 2013. 
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and filed a request to the European Court of Justice to ascertain whether 
this new path is compatible with the EC Treaty. 
3.3 A patent system for Europe 2020 
The story of the endeavours to create an EU patent, together with studies 
and empirical data provide useful inputs for policy decision regarding a 
future patent system, which may allow Europe 2020 to provide firms, 
institutions and individuals with a pan-European system with high quality, 
affordable patent protection to compete worldwide. Such a solution 
requires a number of steps. 
3.3.1 Choose the right level of centralisation and identify a role for 
national patent offices (NPOs) 
The presence of the European Patent Office as a highly regarded institution 
will make it easier to identify the European granting authorities. Efforts by 
the Commission have gone in this direction and the strategy is worth 
pursuing as well as relatively easy compared with other possible solutions. 
However, the creation of a pan-European patent system requires that NPOs 
be brought inside the system with a role and a legitimacy that are 
consistent with the whole process, as long as it does not jeopardise patent 
quality. To this latter purpose, it is advisable that the EPO remain in control 
of the system in order to safeguard patent quality. Currently, there is at 
least one potential conflict of interests that might prevent the adoption of 
necessary solutions; NPOs all have a seat on the Administrative Council of 
the European Patent Organisation. This is consistent with the architecture 
of the EPO; yet, it may become a source of conflict if the EPO becomes EU 
granting authority and its granting procedure is supposed to replace the 
national ones. As for other procedures (trademarks, design), NPOs can be 
the receiving office for applications, thus ensuring capillarity at national 
level. 
One way of solving this problem would be to transform NPOs into 
branches of the EPO, in charge of awarding the pan-European patent title. 
This solution would have the advantage of exploiting the competence and 
expertise of NPOs to ensure the competitiveness of the EU patent system, 
as well as reducing the problem of the backlog if all NPOs contribute to the 
award of the Community patent. At the same time, though, additional 
problems would have to be tackled, such as competition between NPOs, 
which may translate into a ‘race to the bottom’; and divergences in the 
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practice of NPOs, which may remain linked to their national legal 
traditions when deciding upon the award of a Community patent.  
3.3.2 Choose a simple language regime for patents in Europe 
The European Patent Office estimated that up to 80% of technical 
information is contained in Patent literature (PL). Only 20% of the state of 
the art can be found in NPL (non-patent literature), such as papers, 
scientific articles, books, etc. While there is a general problem of 
accessibility of technical information that becomes even more urgent in 
light of a Fifth Freedom, it is undeniable that in certain fields many 
scientific papers and a good share of NPL are written in English. If PL is a 
major source of technical information, then the question arises: could PL be 
expressed by a single language or at least by a reduced language regime for 
Europe? If a pan-European patent system is a matter of competitiveness, 
having only one patent language could reduce application costs and 
uncertainties related to multiple translations.  
On the other hand, with respect to the representation of applicants’ 
interests before the official institutions, a single working language regime 
in written and oral proceedings might be a disadvantage, since it would 
significantly reduce applicants’ freedom of choice as English is the native 
tongue of only 20% of the admitted representatives while the established 
three-language-system of the EPO covers more than 70%. One consequence 
of this would be an increase in costs, particularly for SMEs. 
Over the years solutions have been proposed to mitigate the problem 
of a plurality of languages. The London Agreement is one of those. To 
further make the system accessible, translation machines have been 
proposed. This is more of a palliative then a panacea.  
3.3.3 Set a cost level that is acceptable to applicants and coherent 
policy goals 
The costs of protection are a barrier to the patent system. On the other 
hand, patent costs (meaning administrative costs paid to the NPOs) also 
play a role in focusing business activities by favouring applications only for 
those inventions that are really thought worthy of protection.27 Without a 
                                                     
27 Law and economics literature has explained that costs related to patent 
protection trigger a comparison with alternative forms of protection, including 
trade secrecy. See David D. Friedman, William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner, Some 
 
52 | PATENT LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE 
cost associated to the protection, no patent system could survive and, more 
importantly, would be flooded by thousands of applications from would-
be Edisons. 
The necessity of the fees must be balanced against the interests of 
applicants, particularly when applicants are SMEs or less than large 
corporations with limited resources. A future pan-European system should 
be affordable to applicants, keeping the right incentives and making the 
internal market appealing in terms of the protection granted to innovative 
products. 
European policy-makers could decide to introduce incentives for 
patent protection. For instance, application, maintenance and renewal fees 
could be lowered for certain kinds of applicants, such as universities and 
public research organisations.    
3.3.4 Create a unified patent litigation system with an acceptable 
level of centralisation 
Costs and uncertainties associated with the current litigation system for 
patents in Europe may discourage European applicants and put them at a 
disadvantage with respect to competitors from the US and Japan. 
An issue about the creation of a European and an EU Patents Court in 
Europe seems to be one of the appropriate level of centralisation. To be 
sure, this is not a unique issue for patents; in other instances European 
policy-makers had to decide between centralisation and decentralisation in 
administering such areas of law as antitrust. At the moment, patent 
litigation is fragmented and national jurisdictions may lack coordination, 
which may in exceptional cases result in conflicts when harmonised 
application of law fails. Any future litigation system will require similar 
coordination and appropriate mechanisms to ensure that judicial 
application of patent laws would not re-create a situation of potentially 
conflicting interpretations even within a unified jurisdiction. 
Besides determining the nature of the system, there are other issues to 
be solved, including i) the level of jurisdiction (and competence for each 
                                                                                                                                       
Economics of Trade Secret Law, in 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives  61- 72 (1991); 
see also Janusz A. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp.43–60 (1991). 
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degree); ii) a uniform civil procedure,28 iii) appropriate training for judges; 
iv) possible support for certain categories of litigants, such as SMEs.29 
3.3.5 Improve the quality of patents 
Even if there is consensus about the higher quality of European patents vis-
à-vis patents from other countries (particularly the US), the quality of 
patents remains an issue and a goal for any future patent policy. 
Actions should be taken both at substantive and procedural level to 
promote filing of patent applications with an enhanced quality standard 
that would result in strong patents while assuring timeliness and, in turn, 
legal certainty. The EPO has already started a comprehensive Strategic 
Renewal Programme that includes four concrete initiatives, namely: 
i. Participation in the IP5 Programme that aims at eliminating 
unnecessary duplication of work among the offices, enhancing patent 
examination efficiency and quality, and guaranteeing the stability of 
patent right. This is to be achieved through a series of projects which 
will improve the classification system, the methods and tools to 
retrieve and share information on the state of the art, the patent 
documentation, the handling of applications, the examination 
practice and rules, quality management, training, and the metrics for 
statistical services.30  
ii. The adoption of a ‘Raising the Bar’ initiative, which would lead to the 
granting of those innovations having sufficient merit and meeting the 
requirements for patentability. It includes a number of procedural 
restrictions and mandatory actions along the grant procedure whose 
aim is to increase the quality of incoming applications and 
subsequently filed amendments. 
iii. The adoption of the Single Patent Process Programme, aimed to 
design a patent process that strengthens the position of the EPO as 
                                                     
28 Differences in procedure could make the outcome of litigation highly 
unpredictable. 
29 One form of support could be financial to cover costs of litigation or to buy 
insurance policies for patent litigation, a product that has low diffusion and high 
costs. 
30 The IP5 Group includes patent offices from Europe (EPO), US (USPTO), Japan 
(JPO), Korea (KIPO), and China (SIPO). It works on ten work-packages, each one 
led by one of the offices. 
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the leading patent office in the world, building state-of-the-art tools 
and optimising working methods to create a system that interacts 
dynamically with and adapts to the needs of the Office and the patent 
community. 
iv. The implementation of measures to improve the utilisation of search 
and examination results existing for a single patent application in 
other patent offices. To do so the legal and technical base will be 
established to exchange information on the processing of patent 
applications between patent offices to allow one patent office to 
consult and consider the reuse of findings of another patent office. 
This programme, named the Utilization Implementation Program 
(UIP), is a follow up of the Utilization Pilot Project (UPP) launched 
under the EPN. 
All this should be supported by a sound Patent Information system 
allowing the applicants and the public to access patent documentation 
collections and monitor the prosecution of patent applications. 
Coordination among patent authorities will be increasingly necessary 
to ensure quality and to prevent such phenomena as path dependence. As a 
matter of fact, intense coordination and harmonised granting procedures 
can be conducive either to a restrictive approach (for national pride, one 
office systematically rejects what others have granted) or to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ (other offices grant systematically what one of them has granted). 
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4. TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND 
ACCESS TO CLIMATE-RELATED 
TECHNOLOGIES 
4.1 The impact of technology transfer on innovation 
The transfer of technology is a very broad label for a number of fields 
where the issue is about bringing innovation on the market from producers 
to users, through deployment stages. Among possible aspects of 
technology transfer there are two areas that are particularly relevant both 
in terms of European competitiveness and societal impact. These areas are: 
- Public-private technology transfer, meaning the transfer of research 
results generated by universities and public research institutions. 
- Transfer of ‘green’ (otherwise referred to as ‘climate-related’, CRTs) 
technologies, especially as far as Less Developed Countries (LCDs) 
are concerned. 
Both areas of technology transfer also relate to the impact of public 
investment into research and, more closely, to those research fields 
supposedly aimed at producing innovative products and processes and 
which can complete the transformation of Europe from the old economy to 
the new, innovation-based economy, with value-added, intellectual capital 
intensive activities. 
Notwithstanding these common characteristics and the strategic 
dimension of both kinds of transfer, each field features peculiarities and 
raises policy problems that need to be addressed specifically.  
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4.2 Public-private technology transfer 
There is general agreement and available empirical data on the fact that 
European universities are good at sciences and technology, but there is still 
a poor performance in terms of innovation, particularly if compared with 
US and Japanese universities.31 The situation is serious when considering 
the amount of funding that Europe is pouring into the R&D efforts of 
research and technology organisations (RTOs) and universities through 
framework programmes and other funds. One major goal of any policy on 
innovation should be to pay more attention to the return on investment for 
public money devoted to research.  
The current situation could be summarised by saying that it is easy to 
convert money into knowledge, whereas it is far more complex to convert 
knowledge into money and, in general, into socio-economic benefits. And 
all leads to the recurring question: why is innovation not happening? 
There has probably been much more emphasis on input for R&D than 
on the output and there is now a general call for more concentration on 
output than has been the case so far.  
One way to tackle the problem is to change the nature of the research 
performed at European level, by pointing more ambitiously towards 
market-driven R&D. R&D policy can ex ante direct efforts towards research 
activities that are supposed to fill societal gaps and provide results in terms 
of innovative products and new jobs. Nevertheless, actions are also 
required ex post, that is to say once research programmes are being 
conducted or concluded, since funded institutions (universities, PROs, 
SMEs) must be ready to harvest results and turn them into economic 
development. 
In 2007, the EU Council invited the Commission to develop guidance 
on the management of intellectual property by public research 
organisations. A Recommendation to Member States followed in 2008.32 For 
the time being, the Commission is using soft law instruments to suggest 
good practices that universities should follow in technology transfer 
                                                     
31 This was also a point made by President Barroso in his speech at the European 
Innovation Summit, European Parliament, 13 October 2009, Brussels. 
32 Commission Recommendation on the management of intellectual property in 
knowledge transfer activities and Code of Practice for universities and other public 
research organisations, C(2008) 1329, 4 October  2008. 
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activities, including academia-industry collaborative research, licensing 
and creation of spin-offs. Importantly, the Recommendation invites 
member states to ensure that public research organisations define 
knowledge transfer as a strategic mission. 
It is worth noting that the Commission uses a notion of knowledge 
transfer and not just technology transfer, to embrace all possible forms of 
innovation that are created out of public money and that can be moved 
towards the market. Transfer of technology refers more to codified 
knowledge and calls into question contractual forms or venture partnering, 
whereas transfer of knowledge also means skills, mobility of researchers, 
incentives for talent.  
However, in the field of public-to-private technology transfer, much 
remains to be done at European level to ensure that R&D spending can 
bring innovation and competitiveness for Europe. Sure enough, 
fragmentation of academic systems at national level is not conducive to 
efficient results; however in this specific area the EU lacks power. Yet, by 
modulating the source of funding, incentives can be created for universities 
to perform better and reach that critical mass necessary for any successful 
strategy of technology transfer. In this regard, indicators should be used to 
monitor the performance at European level and reward the best institutions 
while providing incentives for others to improve. 
4.3 Focus: the transfer of climate-related technologies 
One major issue when dealing with CRTs is that of definition, that is to say 
to determine what technologies, technological products, processes and 
skills can be considered as being related to climate change. The adoption of 
the green economy as a new paradigm for a fresh start in environment-
compliant entrepreneurial activities has recently seen a growing interest in 
fostering an economic development based on eco-efficient technologies, not 
just in terms of cost-effective, friendly solutions, but also in terms of new 
products that can help European firms in a strategy of differentiation. Of 
course, the transfer of technology in this field is about ensuring appropriate 
returns on investments. 
At the outset, the definition of CRTs is necessary to identify those 
technologies and fields of research that are in need of financial support 
because of their expected ability to produce the kind of economic results 
that fit the green economy standard of environmentally-friendly 
innovation. In other words, the definition of CRTs is required for public 
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policies willing to actively promote innovation by tailoring specific 
interventions. 
Yet, the definition can have other purposes that relate to the idea of 
allowing LDCs to access proprietary technologies (thus transferring those 
technologies) of multinational corporations (MNCs) through such 
provisions as those concerning compulsory licensing. In this latter 
meaning, the definition is crucial to avoid policy measures favouring 
authoritative access, such as compulsory licensing, do not cause 
unintended consequences by discouraging innovative efforts of firms that, 
as a matter of fact, do not own CRTs. 
Less developed countries are concerned with climate-related 
technologies in several respects. First of all, LDCs are usually countries in 
the world where the cost of labour is a fraction of what is usually paid in 
western developed countries. Thus, LDCs are seen as an opportunity to 
delocalise manufacturing activities in the first place, but also research and 
development in the case of the presence of skilled and qualified 
workforces. The presence of highly qualified, low cost research teams is 
usually one reason to outsource R&D activities to those countries, thus 
reducing the costs of having innovative products and solutions for MNCs.  
Secondly, LDCs can be also potentially huge markets for western 
products and technologies. Consequently, the choice to delocalise R&D and 
manufacturing activities is also justified by the fact that LDCs also 
represent the natural commercial outlet for those technologies. In this 
respect, CRTs can be a competitive factor as long as they can be 
commercialised abroad by European countries and MNCs in general. But in 
all cases of localising activities abroad, product development has to be 
considered as having the same level of quality and robustness to become an 
innovation as you can find in Europe.  
Following the well publicised tensions between western countries 
and LDCs that usually emerge at WTO level, the problem with CRTs is that 
LDCs apply political pressure to have free or easier access to technologies, 
piercing the protection of intellectual property rights that MNCs usually 
use to retain their competitive edge. Again, this is the kind of friction 
usually felt at international level and concerning other technologies such as 
pharmaceutical leads, also potentially significant both in economic terms 
and for the impact they can have on people’s lives, as far as important 
diseases are concerned. 
The discourse with regard to LDCs is probably different as the value 
chain for the conception, research, deployment and commercialisation of 
A NEW APPROACH TO INNOVATION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION | 59 
green technologies is far more complex than others and may require the 
interaction of many firms at different levels. 
Of course, intellectual property protection (mainly patent protection) 
plays a crucial role also in the field of CRTs, since large investments are 
required along the value chain. Yet, the role of IP protection should be 
emphasised, since many CRTs are in the public domain and no longer 
require patent protection. Where intellectual property rights exist, access to 
technologies translate straightforwardly into overcoming those barriers or 
paying right-holders for access. LDCs have a great need to access CRTs for 
the production of energy in a way that does not compromise environment 
equilibrium, while allowing industrial and human activities to prosper. At 
the same time, those countries have limited resources, if any, with which to 
pay. Stuck in a situation of need and impossibility, the political leverage 
used by LDCs is the request of compulsory licensing, backed also by 
important scholarly works on this topic,33 or the lowering of barriers by 
refusing intellectual property protection for some technologies.34  
Compulsory licensing is always disfavoured by the industry, because 
of the negative incentive it has on the propensity to invest in R&D and 
business development in LDCs. Yet, the real issue with CRTs is whether 
compulsory licensing or elimination of intellectual property protection is 
the kind of measure that actually will favour the access of LDCs to CRTs. 
There is a serious risk that solutions advocated for other technologies (such 
as drugs or chemical compounds) would not work for CRTs, while creating 
negative incentives for innovation. 
It has been noted by most players that CRTs is a broad formula that 
refers to technologies not necessarily protected by patents. Due to 
complexities in the value chain of innovation and in core technologies, 
CRTs are characterised by large amounts of enabling know-how not 
necessarily codified and not necessarily patented. Thus, climate-related 
technology is a wider notion than what might initially be thought, a part of 
which (not necessarily a big part of which) is covered by intellectual 
                                                     
33 See Tracy Lewis and Jerome H. Reichman, (2003), Using Liability Rules to 
Stimulate Local Innovations in Developing Countries: A Law and Economics 
Primer, available at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/ 
lewisreichman.pdf (last visit April 18, 2010). 
34 There is a problem of discriminating technologies by denying protection, since 
under TRIPs Agreement discrimination is not allowed. 
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property rights. The presence of know-how and not codified knowledge 
implies a radical change of perspective when dealing with such topics as 
access to those technologies and their horizontal transfer to other countries. 
If knowledge is fully codified and entirely protected by patents, 
access can be granted by the patent-holder through licensing. On the 
contrary, when knowledge is not fully codified – as it is for CRTs – 
licensing is not key or is not the actual enabling factor for the transfer to be 
complete. When know-how is at stake, cooperation is required together 
with, or as an alternative to, patent (or patent portfolios) licensing. 
Furthermore, while access to patents is a matter of reading 
documents, access to technology in a broader sense – including know-how 
– implies both the ability to read and interpret the teaching of the patent 
and to acquire knowledge through collaboration, a notion that economic 
and organisational literature has called absorptive capacity.35 As a 
consequence, the effectiveness of the transfer does not depend exclusively 
on the willingness of the owner to share, but also on the ability of the 
recipient to fully apprise and assimilate the technology. 
From a policy perspective, this view has multiple implications, the 
most evident of which is that actions also on the demand side of technology 
are required and, to a more general level, the idea of access to technology 
must be reshaped in a more cooperative dimension. To go into more detail, 
some preliminary conclusions can be reached. 
First, the transfer of certain kinds of technologies, such as CRTs, is 
more relational and requires some level of cooperation and interaction 
between the transferor and the transferee. Licensing is part of the process, 
but it is not the only means. Second, because compulsory licensing is 
effective only on the supply side, any imposition on the patent owner to 
share its technology does not automatically result in the fruitful utilisation 
of the technology by the recipient. At the same time, though, compulsory 
licensing brings about negative incentives on R&D investments and 
business development since returns for technology producers become 
shaky. 
                                                     
35 The idea was first developed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), Absorptive capacity: 
A new perspective on learning and innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
Volume 35, Issue 1, pp. 128-152, and in its original formulation refers to such 
organisation as research teams of firms, but it can be easily applied to states. 
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Third, for the reasons stated above, weakening intellectual property 
protection or refusing patent protection on some technology does not 
produce an automatic effect on the acquisition of technologies by LDCs if 
they lack absorptive capacity. 
Fourth, any policy that disfavours intellectual property protection ex 
ante (by denying protection) or ex post (by granting access mandatorily) 
removes incentives on MNCs, and companies in general, to invest in LDCs 
and, particularly, to provide infrastructure. 
In this respect, one could easily conclude that if the removal of 
intellectual property protection is not per se conducive to the transfer of 
CRTs towards LDCs due to a lack of absorptive capacity, technology 
holders could forego their intellectual property rights in those countries 
since locals would not be able to free ride on the technology anyhow; by 
eliminating proprietary rights the transfer could concededly be easier. 
However, this conclusion is untenable. In a globalised scenario, the choice 
to delocalise R&D is a common strategy for technological firms and it has 
been a common path for European firms. As a result, in LDCs, R&D centres 
are started by several companies that compete on a global market. In this 
context, intellectual property protection becomes necessary to prevent 
appropriation of newly created knowledge not by locals (populations, 
firms, institutions), which lack absorptive capacity unless trained 
specifically in situ, but by local personnel of competitors (usually well-
trained and skilled), an outcome that would turn into a loss of competitive 
advantage. The risk of opportunistic behaviours by competitors speaks in 
favour of ensuring intellectual property protection for firms willing to 
delocalise R&D and invest abroad. 
In this respect, intellectual property rights are still one of the 
determinants of foreign direct investments (FDI) and European firms need 
to be assisted by this kind of protection even when abroad, following 
internationalisation strategies. Notably, a failure to protect R&D 
investments abroad due to opportunistic behaviours of competing MNCs 
or other foreign institutions would result in harm to LDCs, since in the long 
run FDIs will be redirected towards those countries that ensure higher 
standards of protection for R&D investments. 
The aforementioned points are consistent with some of the final 
findings of a study commissioned by DG Trade “Are IPR a barrier to the 
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transfer of climate change technology?” (2009).36 The study finds no argument 
in favour of extending the use of TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights) provisions on compulsory licensing to climate change 
technologies. Furthermore: 
Dismantling or weakening the intellectual property rights 
system would not only hinder the access of developing countries 
to costly technology, it would also hinder the access to low cost 
technology as IPR protected technology is also to be found among 
the low abatement cost technologies.  
Indeed, a study of the Vattenfall Institute and McKinsey highlights 
the fact that many low-cost technologies are available to reduce CO2 
emissions that could be eventually used also by LDCs.37 
                                                     
36 Copenhagen Economics and The IPR Company, Are IPR a Barrier to the Transfer of 
Climate Change Technology?, Copenhagen, 2009. 
37 See Vattenfall Institute and McKinsey, Global cost curve of GHG abatement 
opportunities beyond business as usual by 2030, (2007). 
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All this seems to suggest that the technology transfer of climate-
related technologies requires a step beyond mere licensing schemes. Policy 
measures should be worked out accordingly. LDCs tend to associate the 
horizontal transfer of technologies from rich countries with local 
development and autochthon entrepreneurship that should be fostered by 
cooperation with technology owners. Coupled with the need for an 
increased absorptive capacity, local development is only possible through 
cooperation between transferor and transferee. And cooperation inevitably 
involves the whole value chain of CRTs. 
In the frame of cooperation, there are a number of issues that can be 
addressed and that equally affect the diffusion of CRTs in LDCs besides 
building absorptive capacity, such as: 
- A qualified assessments of market needs 
- Creation of transparent markets 
- Elimination of tariff barriers (if any) for green technologies 
- Identifying adequate forms of financing 
- Building a reliable framework for procurement 
It seems like an efficient transfer of CRTs is more about building 
ecosystems of innovation than just granting access to proprietary 
technology by licensing intellectual property rights. To this purpose, 
innovative mechanisms have been proposed to facilitate the diffusion and 
transfer of CRTs.38 
                                                     
38 A structured proposal is offered by the Alliance for Clean Technology 
Innovation (ACTI), a group of leading companies, including 3M, Air Liquide, 
Alstom, ExxonMobil, General Electric, Microsoft, Philips, Siemens and Vestas. The 
proposal for the creation of technology centers is provided in a concept paper titled 
Climate Change Technology Centers, 2 October 2009. 
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5. STANDARDS AND STANDARDISATION 
POLICY IN EUROPE 
tandardisation policy has been a key element of EU innovation and 
competitiveness policies since the launch of the Single Market 
Initiative in 1985.39 After 1998, the European Commission successfully 
launched the “New Approach” to standardisation as a co-regulatory 
scheme that today governs the formation of industry standards in the EU 
(Directive 98/34). However, the debate on the role that standards can play 
for the future of the Internal Market is still open, and some commentators 
have questioned the usefulness of standards as drivers of EU 
competitiveness and growth. In more detail, the added value of standards 
in the EU also depends on how standards are formed, who can participate 
in the development and definition of standards, where and how standards 
apply, and how often they are updated and refined.   
Studies at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels in various 
European countries and around the world have, in certain areas, 
demonstrated the clear benefits of standards and standardisation to the 
wider economy. Standards may play a role in facilitating the sharing of 
common technological solutions, removing trade barriers, enabling 
technology transfer, facilitating certainty in the marketplace and boosting 
the creation of complementary upstream and downstream markets. 
However, in some cases an early, top-down standardisation can lead to 
                                                     
39 A standard is a document that provides, inter alia, requirements, rules and 
guidelines for a process, product or service. These requirements are sometimes 
complemented by a description of the process, products or services. The process of 
formulating, issuing and implementing standards is called standardisation. 
S 
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undesirable results, such as locking industries into inferior standards. At 
the same time, standards can have both positive and negative effects on 
competition, and this inevitably warrants a case-by-case approach. 
Figure 14. The role of standards in the innovation process 
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Source: European Commission. 
 
The key problems identified by the European Commission in 
promoting an active use of standards to foster innovation and growth in 
Europe are the following: 
• Lack of awareness by innovation actors. In particular, SME access to 
the development and implementation of standards must improve. 
Education and information dissemination about the decisive role 
standards can play for the Single Market is largely missing in Europe. 
• Prejudices about standards: for example, there are still people that 
think that standards can hamper innovation per se, since they reduce 
product variety. In reality, the only thing that should be kept in mind 
is that standards, despite being potentially useful in reducing market 
uncertainty, transaction costs and barriers to trade, are no panacea. 
They are a tool, and must be used properly.  
• Complexities at the interface between IPR and standards. To some 
extent, it may seem that standards and intellectual property rights are 
almost incompatible, since the former foster openness, whereas the 
latter imply exclusivity rights. Again, reality is much more complex 
than this: one the one hand, in some markets individual IP-protected 
products become de facto industry standards; in other markets 
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consortia of businesses pool their IPRs to build the standard of the 
future, and compete with similarly developed standards; in other 
sectors, standards are formally defined with the help of 
standardisation bodies and often require licensing at FRAND (Fair, 
Reasonable and Non Discriminatory) terms. What’s more, some 
markets imply the co-existence of these situations, with some 
complementary products being proprietary, and others being 
dominated by international standards. Often, the different regimes 
also depend on the stage of development of the different 
complementary products, where brand new products are more 
seldom subject to international standards than more established ones.  
• Access to standardisation by SMEs. SMEs seem to be absent in many 
of the stages of standardisation, and most notably in the standard 
development phase. The participation of SMEs in private standard-
setting bodies is hampered by collective action problems, although 
recently there have been examples of SMEs pooling their efforts and 
sharing costs by hiring a specialist to represent their interests during 
the standardisation process (e.g. in the case of ECAP, the European 
Consortium of Anchors Producers, which represents SMEs in EOTA 
and CEN committees40). A recent study for the European 
Commission identified several barriers for SMEs to benefit from 
standards: i) awareness of standards; ii) awareness of the importance 
of standards for the SME’s own company; iii) tracing standards; iv) 
obtaining standards; v) understanding standards; (vi) implementing 
standards; (vii) evaluating the implementation of standards. In 
addition, SMEs face a sequence of barriers to benefit from 
involvement in standardisation, ranging from awareness of the 
process and importance of involvement in standardisation for the 
SME’s own company; to the tracing of standardisation projects, the 
ways in which SMEs can become involved effectively, and the 
evaluation of standards.41 Finally, and perhaps even more 
                                                     
40 For a detailed description, see: De Vries, H. et al. (2009), SME access to European 
Standardisation. Enabling small and medium-sized enterprises to achieve greater 
benefit from standards and from involvement in standardisation, Rotterdam 
School of Management, Erasmus University, at http://www.ecap-sme.org/ 
documenti/primapagina/stampa/SME%20Access%20Report%202009-08-21.pdf.  
41 Ibid., at 12. The same study quotes earlier surveys such as the one conducted by 
the German Occupational Safety and Health committee, which found that 35% of 
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importantly, the involvement of SMEs as users in the standardisation 
process appears essential to guaranteeing that developed standards 
are easy to use for SMEs afterwards.  
• Global market access and international standards. Difficulties in 
accessing European and international standards also implies that 
European firms end up facing difficulties in promoting their products 
in wider markets. In this respect, the alignment of European 
standards with international standards is crucial for the 
competitiveness of European firms, in particular SMEs, and in 
particular in sectors dominated by formal standardisation.  
Recently, the EXPRESS working group published a report focusing 
on the future of standardisation in the European Union, recommending, 
inter alia, an enhanced cooperation between European Standardisation 
Organisations (ESOs); enhanced cooperation between European 
Commission DGs to ensure that standards are consistently used as a basis 
for achieving policy goals; stronger interaction of European 
Standardisation Bodies with fora and consortia, researchers and industry 
stakeholders; and more coordination between the European 
Standardisation System and global standards.42  
In addition to the recommendations of the EXPRESS group (and 
those that will come from an upcoming study on IPR and standardisation), 
other initiatives are likely to promote standardisation and its impact on 
innovation in the near future. These include the EU Standardisation Policy 
                                                                                                                                       
SMEs had no idea of sources from which to find information about standards. Also 
NORMAPME (European Office of Crafts, Trades and Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises for Standardisation) reported that finding information about standards 
– including whether a given standard is still in place – is among the most difficult 
issues for SMEs. In addition, SMEs also find difficulties in understanding the 
context of the standard, such as the references to other standards, etc.  
42 See Standardisation for a competitive and innovative Europe: A vision for 2020, Report 
of the Expert Panel for the Review of the European Standardisation System, 
exp384, February 2010, available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
policies/european-standards/files/express/exp_384_express_report_final_distrib 
_en.pdf. The Expert Panel for the Review of the European Standardisation System 
(EXPRESS) comprised 30 individual experts from European, national and 
international standards organisations, industry, SMEs, NGOs, trade unions, 
academia, fora and consortia and public authorities from EU member states and 
EFTA countries. 
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Package, a Workshop organised by DG RTD on the use of standards for 
innovation; the stronger inclusion of standardisation issues and the use of 
standards in the upcoming 8th Framework Programme for Research (FP8); 
and measures to provide support standardisation in specific areas (Smart 
Grids, Hydrogen, etc.). 
Below, we explore the findings of the CEPS Task Force as regards 
different aspects of standardisation policy. Section 5.1 below explores the 
issue of industry standards, IPRs and competition. Section 5.2 deals with 
European Standardisation bodies. Section 5.3 summarises the main 
findings of the CEPS Task Force as regards standardisation.  
5.1 Standards, IPRs, and competition 
In certain sectors, one of the issues that affects the development of certain 
types of standards and their impact on competition and competitiveness is 
the interface between IPRs and standards. The European Commission has 
recalled on several occasions that misuse of IPRs in the standardisation 
process can significantly affect access by industry players to relevant 
markets. For example, former Commissioner for Competition (and current 
Commissioner for the Digital Agenda) Neelie Kroes stated recently that:  
Abuse practices in standard setting can harm innovation and 
lead to higher prices for companies and consumers. For its part, 
the Commission will continue to vigorously enforce the EU’s 
antitrust rules in this area, for the benefit of technical progress and 
European consumers.  
This approach was echoed to a certain extent on the other side of the 
Atlantic, where concerns about the potential impact of strategic behaviour 
in the standardisation process led FTC Chairman Stan Leibowitz to state 
(within the Rambus case discussions) that “[The FTC will] continue to make 
standard setting and monopolization cases a priority.” 
Analysing the role of (private) standards with respect to the use of 
intellectual property, competition and innovation is a very complex 
exercise.  
• On the one hand, as shown in Figure 15 below, standards can provide 
substantial benefits in a number of sectors, and especially in sectors 
with significant network effects. The enhanced interoperability 
triggered by standardisation helps improve product quality because a 
large number of undertakings work for the improvement of the 
standard. At the same time, risk for consumers is reduced due to 
acceptance of a commonly recognised standard. The overall impact 
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on competition is positive whenever the standard fosters aggressive 
downstream competition, where the standard provides a level 
playing field for all companies that want to compete in a given 
relevant market. Overall, the positive impact of standards in terms of 
certainty in the marketplace can lead to better quality products, at 
lower costs.  
• However, when it comes to private standard-setting, not all that 
glitters is gold.  
o First, when chosen too early, standards can limit product 
variety by stimulating ‘intra-standard’ competition in markets 
where ‘inter-standard’ competition could have led to better 
competitive outcomes and faster innovation to the benefit of 
end consumers.  
o Second, when they include IP-protected components, standards 
may lead to excessive market power for those that possess IP 
rights over essential elements of the standard: recent antitrust 
cases such as Dell and Rambus confirm that strategic behaviour 
may occur in standard-setting organisations (see below). Even 
more generally, whenever a de facto industry standard is 
generated by a ‘winner-takes-all’ game, where those standards 
that reach the tipping point wipe all rival standards away from 
the relevant market, the market power that accrues to the 
holders of essential patents may be significant, especially if the 
pace of innovation in the sector at hand does not lead to 
overlapping generations of products and – consequently – to a 
genuine ‘competition for the market’.  
o Third, the inclusion of IP-protected components in standards 
adopted by an industry can give rise to potentially strategic 
behaviour of all sorts. Patent ambushes, patent trolls, royalty 
staking, hold-out and hold-up behaviour could occur in certain 
markets, and this could exert a chilling effect on incentives to 
engage in virtuous ‘co-opetition’ between firms. In some cases 
private standard-setting – when rules are not defined clearly in 
advance and pools are badly run – may border on situations of 
anti-commons and ‘patent thickets’ – a situation that may 
warrant clarification in years to come (see below).  
o Fourth, private standard-setting organisations may lead to 
instances of collusion and collective boycott. Collusive 
outcomes are possible when the standard-setting process 
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facilitates horizontal coordination between competing firms 
and increases the transparency of markets. At the same time, 
standard-setting organisations may try to foreclose market 
access for players that wish to enter the market.43 
Figure 15. Benefits and costs of standards 
 
 
Source: Presentation by Gunnar Wolf, 4th meeting of the Task Force, 14 January 2010.  
 
The ultimate impact of the standard-setting process on competition 
and innovation depends on the relative weight of those costs and benefits. 
Negative effects generated by the standardisation process should be limited 
when reasonably possible, to avoid the innovation process becoming 
distorted over time.  
                                                     
43 See, for example, Allied Tube in the US. 
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To be sure, the basic tenets of standard-setting in many sectors are 
that: 
• In terms of development, standards should ideally be developed by 
all affected stakeholders. 
• They also need to be based on a solid consensus: 
• Standards should be broadly accepted.  
• Examination of the selected technologies for which patent protection 
is requested demands very sophisticated standard setting processes 
and complex interfaces between standards-developing organisations 
(SDOs) and patent offices.  
5.1.1 Focus: Practices in patent pools 
A ‘patent pool’ can be defined as a portfolio of patents essential to the same 
standard but owned by different parties. The purpose of any patent pool is 
to facilitate licensing of essential patents by creating a ‘one-stop shop’ to 
reduce transaction and administrative costs. This provides increased 
certainty and predictability to the market on the level of royalty rates and 
may establish a market reference. This also ensures uniform and non-
discriminatory licensing of essential patents. 
Patent pools are common, especially in sectors where products take 
the form of complex systems, requiring a large number of complementary 
products and technologies. When this happens, the success of a given 
technological innovation may require interoperability: in turn, 
interoperability may need standardisation: and the implementation of 
complex standardised technologies may be faciliated by patent pools.  
Patent pools can have pro-competitive effects for the following 
reasons: 
• They can help in establishing a single reasonable royalty rate (that, 
according to economic theory, may be expected to be lower than the 
cost of separately negotiated licenses); 
• They can clear blocking patents that would otherwise prevent 
competitive entry into a given field; 
• They can reduce litigation costs and the costs of administering 
multiple patent licensing programmes; 
• They can reduce royalty stacking problems; 
• They can lower transaction costs and increase the efficiency of the 
system, and 
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• They can provide funding for research and innovation, since widely 
accepted licensing programmes allow members to generate revenues 
from patents, which can be re-invested in research and innovation. 
Building a successful patent pool is, however, far from easy. The key 
challenge is building consensus and achieving wide acceptance as regards 
the proposed initiative. In particular, a successful pool has to attract both 
large and small licensors and offer all licensees an attractive licensing 
solution. To achieve broad acceptance among licensees, a pool should: 
• Offer a value-based license; 
• Include administrative tools that enhance efficiency and make the 
reporting and payment process easy; 
• Include enforcement and compliance mechanisms to give licensees 
confidence that all market participants are treated equally. 
Important challenges are faced by patent pools already at the early 
stage of the formation of the pool. Without proper information exchange, 
there is a risk of multiple patent calls and the formation of several smaller 
(and thus less efficient) licensing programmes. In addition, multiple efforts 
to persuade patent owners to support the selection of one administrator can 
also create confusion and waste resources. Thus, for the success of the pool, 
it is important that the selection of the administrator is quick, transparent, 
and has the broadest possible support. Typically, a ‘beauty contest’ is the 
best way to select the best candidate in a transparent way. 
The time needed to establish a patent pool depends on: 
• Frequency of facilitation meetings; 
• Authority of representatives of each patent owner and pace to 
approve decisions of the facilitation group; 
• Willingness of patent owners to compromise on key issues, such as 
royalty rates and sharing mechanisms; 
• Number of parties (large number increases complexity). 
Connections between SSOs and Patent Pools may be held necessary 
since today there are multiple competing standards for almost each 
technology, especially in the ICT field. Therefore it may be in the interests 
of the SSO that patent licensing issues are quickly addressed. Shortly after 
finalisation of a standard, SSOs could for example encourage patent owners 
to meet under the supervision of a patent facilitator to agree on common 
licensing terms and conditions, make them public, and quickly start a 
patent pool. 
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An important feature of patent pools is the independence and 
professionalism of its administrator. In this respect, guidance could be 
provided to pool participants to avoid the appointment of biased 
administrators, who may end up stifling competition within the pool. In 
addition, the success of technology innovation may be linked to the 
capability to interoperate, hence to the success of the standards, while the 
success of standardisation may be linked to the success of the patent pool. 
When potential problems are solved effectively in terms of governance and 
competition, patent pools can have a pro-competitive effect, lowering 
prices, increasing efficiency and thereby promoting innovation. 
 
Box 3. The LTE patent pool 
A good example of a complex patent pool is the LTE (Long-Term Evolution) 
pool, which is on the way to becoming Next Generation Standard for mobile 
broadband communications – 45 mobile operators worldwide have already 
announced that they will adopt it. LTE has been standardised by 3GPP, and 
more than 350 companies have participated in the working groups. LTE IPR 
declarations on the ETSI database are 1,860 as of January 11th, 2010. 
The following graph exemplifies the number of IPR declarations on the 
LTE project. 
Figure 16. Number of IPR declarations in the LTE consortium, as of January 2010 
 
Source: Sisvel, presentation at the 4th meeting of the CEPS Task Force, 14 January 2010. 
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One important issue for the LTE patent pooling is setting the appropriate 
Royalty Rate. Different methods for doing this are the following: 
• Some players* stated that the maximum royalty acceptable from the 
market is a single digit % (e.g. ≤ 10%). 
• Pool royalty rate could adjust in response to increases in the number of 
patents in pool portfolio.  
• Whenever a large licensor joins, the royalty rate could increase – 
preventing dilution of other licensors’ allocations. 
• Small patent owners could also be protected by allocating a significant 
portion of royalties equally among licensors. 
The possible results of different approaches are summarised in the 
following tables, using the LTE case as an example.   
Figure 17. LTE royalty level – different scenarios 
No patent pool 
 
2 patent pools and outside patent owners 
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1 patent pool and outside patent owners 
 
Ideal Scenario 
 
Source: Sisvel, presentation at the 4th meeting of the CEPS Task Force, 14 January 2010. 
 
5.2 European standardisation 
In terms of standardisation policy, the CEPS Task Force welcomed the 
initiatives that will be launched by the European Commission in the 
months to come. These include: 
• The Standardisation Policy Package (mid-2010), which is likely to 
include a Communication, a legislation proposal for the reform of the 
European Standardisation System; 
• The stronger inclusion of standardisation in the FP8: 
Standardisation as evaluation criteria. Separate programme for 
measurement and testing (pre-normative standards); 
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In addition, the European Commission is expected to issue new 
guidelines on horizontal agreements, which will cover horizontal R&D 
cooperation. This will be a key opportunity to provide guidance on the 
practices that are likely to minimize the anti-competitive impacts of 
standard-setting activities. The CEPS Task Force led to the identification of 
a number of practices that can be considered relevant from this standpoint: 
• The relationship between standard-setting organisations and IPRs 
should be clear: The rules for disclosure of IPRs and licensing 
provisions that will apply to the standard developed by the SSO 
should be clear. This helps avoid ‘patent thickets’, which in many 
industries force SSOs to undertake a sort of ‘messy private ordering’ 
and to  ‘bargain in the shadow of patent law’ – in particular to avoid 
problems of hold-out (‘last in line’ bargaining) and hold-up 
(opportunistic exploitation of third party commitments; difficult to 
avoid in component/network technologies with ‘probabilistic’ 
patents). The new Horizontal Guidelines should:  
o Keep options for SSOs open (e.g., no mandate on ex ante 
solutions but only guidance on how this might be done); 
o Emphasise the general benefits of standards (for companies, 
national competition authorities and judges); 
o Provide guidance on the relationship between standards and 
IPRs (also other than patents). 
• There is a strong need for developing standards practices, especially 
as regards the ex ante disclosure regimes. The CEPS Task Force 
hosted a discussion on possible regimes for the disclosure of IPRs 
during the standard-setting process. In particular: 
o Ex-Ante Disclosure of IPRs is an important feature for the 
avoidance of Patent Ambush, and an important feature for 
building up IPR databases at SSOs 
o Ex-Ante Disclosure of FRAND licensing Promise is important for 
necessary privilege under Art. 101(3) EC Treaty as every 
standard by its very nature limits technical competition 
o Ex-Ante Disclosure of Maximum Royalty Rates is far more 
controversial, since the required knowledge for determination 
is often unavailable; the collective rate is theoretical and usually 
far above real rates; high theoretical collective rates can 
represent a significant competitive disadvantage for the 
standard at hand; and they create a competitive advantage for 
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‘early’ contributors over ‘late’ contributors since early 
contributors declare their IPRs at a time where there is less 
competition. 
o The ex ante disclosure of most restrictive licensing terms is also not 
recommended, since the required knowledge for determination 
is seldom available; the missing knowledge will result in vague 
terms with many disclaimers; the terms are usually hardly 
comparable; it creates a high risk of severe delay of time-to-
market of standard as licensing terms must be created and 
reviewed by legal and commercial experts; it also brings a high 
anti-trust risk, even if group discussions are formally not 
allowed; and it does not help to foster mutual trust, which is the 
basis for compromises and broad acceptance. 
• General guidance on standard practices, e.g. FRAND licensing in 
terms of its goals and problems of enforcement. FRAND goals are 
essentially to constrain the ex post price resulting from ‘undue’ ex 
post market power. In general, this is negotiated on a bilateral basis 
between the patentee and each licensee outside the SSO. Problems 
with this system sometimes emerge in the enforcement phase. 
Agencies and courts generally have little proficiency in assessing the 
reasonableness of royalties, and possible fines and penalties can tip 
bargaining incentives in favour of the licensee or the licensor, 
depending on the direction they take.  
• Standard-setting organisations should continue to improve rules 
(e.g., rules on transferability) and consider and try other 
solutions/mechanisms where appropriate. 
Table 2 below shows some example of practices in standard-setting 
organisations and comments on their likely impact in terms of competition 
and innovation. 
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Table 2. IPR Disclosure rules and potential impact 
Rule Licensor member 
promises 
Comment 
Disclosure “I have some patents here 
that may relate to the 
technology. I may or may 
not license them once 
we’ve agreed on a 
standard.” 
Enables ‘inventing around’, which 
also reduces incentives to disclose. 
Does not remove the ‘nuclear option’ 
(injunction) if patents are included in 
the standard. Avoids Patent 
Ambush. 
Royalty free 
license 
“For the uses covered by 
the standard, you may 
use my patented 
technology for free.” 
Highly effective for users of 
standard. However, some IP holders 
will avoid the SSO like the plague, 
which may be counterproductive 
(they can still sue later on). Common 
in open source IP environments. No 
financial compensation for 
technology providers. 
(F)RAND “Once the standard is set, 
I will license my essential 
patents on fair, 
reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms and 
conditions.” 
Takes the threat of an injunction off 
the table. However, what’s 
reasonable? 25% of running 
royalties? 5%? Are grantbacks or 
admissions of validity and 
infringement part of (F)RAND? 
Unilateral,  
ex-ante 
(F)RAND 
“I will license my 
essential patents at 
(F)RAND terms, no 
worse than $10/unit plus 
exclusive grantback for 5 
years.” 
For users of standard better than 
(F)RAND alone. May allow choosing 
alternative technologies while there 
are still options. May impose 
significant delay on standard setting. 
Penalty 
defaults 
“For any undisclosed 
essential patent, the 
maximum royalty is 
$10,000.” 
Creates a strong incentive to search 
for and disclose essential patents. For 
users of standards very effective but 
for technology providers a heavy 
burden. 
Joint ex ante 
negotiations 
Actual negotiation of 
licensing terms at the 
outset of the process. 
Front-loads and delays the technical 
process. Engineers hate it. SSOs are 
afraid of liability from potential 
(buyer or seller) price fixing. 
Source: Gunnar Wolf, presentation at the 4th meeting of the CEPS Task Force, 14 January 2010. 
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Finally, when it comes to the licensing phase of standard-setting, two 
options are normally available: 
• Frame conditions can be set within SDOs that have well established and 
accepted IPR policies, a broad range of participants, and FRAND 
licensing promise. 
• On the contrary, licenses can be negotiated outside SDOs through bilateral 
licensing agreements (very flexible) or via patent pools (if common 
license agreements can be found). 
5.3 Conclusions 
The CEPS Task Force on innovation policy reached widespread agreement 
on the following issues: 
• A sound standardisation policy is key for European competitiveness. 
Standards contribute positively to growth and competition, especially 
when they are picked up by the market and not imposed top-down. 
The increasingly blurred boundaries between types of standards (for 
example, see e-health standards) today calls for enhanced 
cooperation and common governance of the three European 
Standardisation Bodies, and possibly for a single EU standards 
agency that replaces the three organisations CEN, CENELEC and 
ETSI.   
• There is no possible ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to standards: this 
means that rules must be crafted along basic principles and then 
refined on a sectoral basis. For example, there is no possibility to 
adopt a harmonised approach to standardisation in ICT markets, as 
they are too heterogeneous. Emphasis on open standards may be 
justified in cases where the market can only accommodate one 
standard and there is no competition between different standards. In 
all other cases, the market should be allowed to pick the best 
standard, be that open or proprietary.   
• Competition rules should provide general guidance. In particular, the 
upcoming new guidelines on horizontal agreements, which will focus 
in particular on R&D agreements, should provide the right basis for 
engaging in consortia, SSOs and patent pools by minimizing the risk 
of strategic behaviour. In this respect, the European Commission 
should work on future policy documents (such as the horizontal 
guidelines) that:  
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o Clarify the relationship between Standard-Setting 
Organisations and IPRs  
o Provide general guidance on standards practices (e.g. 
disclosure regimes, FRAND licensing, transfer of IPR) 
o Support the creations of pro-competitive, independently 
administrated patent pools. 
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
CEN  Comité Européen de Normalisation (European Committee 
for Standardisation) 
CENELEC  Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechniques 
(European Committee for Electro-technical Standardisation) 
CRT  Climate-Related Technology 
DG  Directorate General (of the European Commission) 
DG ENTR  Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry  
DG RTD  Directorate General for Research 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
EIT  European Institute of Innovation and Technology 
EOTA European Organisation for Technical Approvals 
EPLA  European Patent Litigation Agreement 
EPO  European Patent Office 
ERA  European Research Area 
ETSI  European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
ICT  Information and Communication Technologies 
IP5  The five major intellectual property offices: the European 
Patent Office, the US Patent and Trademark Office, the Japan 
Patent Office, the State Intellectual Property Office of  China, 
and the Korean Intellectual Property Office. 
KET  Key Enabling Technology 
KIC  Knowledge and Innovation Community 
LDC  Less Developed Country 
LTE  Long-Term Evolution standard 
MNC  Multinational Corporation 
NPL  Non-Patent Literature 
PL  Patent Literature 
R&D  Research and Development 
R&D&I  Research, Development and Innovation 
RSFF  Risk Sharing Finance Facility 
UPLS  Uniform Patent Litigation System 
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